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PSYCHE & EROS

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PSYCHOLOGY

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Vol. I

SEPT.-OCT., 1920

No. 2

Analysis of a Case of Bird Phobia

By DR. WM. STEKEL,

Vienna

Animal-phobias [zoophobia] are amongst the commonest phenomena to come under the observation of the psychotherapist who treats anxiety states. The fear of snakes, mice, rats, and toads is so extraordinarily common that it may almost be regarded as a normal phenomenon. The fear of snakes has some semblance of reasonableness about it owing to the fact that there are such things as poisonous snakes. But the unnaturalness of such a fear is at once apparent if we consider its absurdity and exaggerated affectivity. I treated a woman whose whole life was influenced and shaped by her fear of snakes. Because of it she insisted on living on the upper stories of hotels and always entered her room apprehensively, fearing that a snake might possibly have climbed up into it. Consequently she carefully kept away from roof-drains. (A snake might crawl down such a leader!) In most cases this apprehensiveness, which manifests itself in such an over-emphasis and in erotic symbolism, is explained when we know that the snake is a phallic symbol as well as the Biblical symbol for sin. Mice, rats, and toads are, to be sure, unappetizing animals whose symbolic utilization as a "defense" against a sexual desire, by virtue of the disgust they generate, is comprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, there is no animal that may not become the object of a complicated phobia. I know neurotics who are afraid of horses, cats, dogs, leeches, monkeys, etc. Fear of dogs is not necessarily always combined with lyssophobia [fear of hydrophobia].

In most cases an analysis will easily bring forth proof that the malady is a matter of the psychological fixation of an infantile attitude, i. e., a variety of

"psychosexual infantilism." But the matter must not be taken too lightly and a case must not be considered analyzed when the sexual symbols have been identified. Otherwise the analyst will suffer the humiliation of learning that the symptoms continue notwithstanding all his analysis and all his explanations and that the phobia continues unabated and is immune against all his psychotherapeutic efforts—a fact which once caused Freud to declare a phobia "psychically unassailable" and, consequently, not psychically determined.

The following analysis will show how dangerous it is to conceive of such an analysis as a purely sexual matter. Most phobias are much more complicated than the novice in *psa. imagines*. Symptoms, like the neuroses, have a manifold determination and are built up, as it were, in several planes. This will be made clear in the analysis of a bird-phobia that follows.

Mr. I. K., 41 years old, a manufacturer, has been suffering since his childhood from various apprehensions which centered about an almost unconquerable topophobia (fear of places) and a "fear of birds." The roots of the topophobia are indissolubly linked with those of the bird-phobia and we shall therefore for the present devote all our attention to the latter. Since his childhood our patient has feared birds of all kinds. He is uncomfortable even in the presence of a caged bird in the homes he visits. He is pained on encountering any member of the bird family (cock, goose, duck, etc.) in the street; there is something uncanny about them. This vague kind of discomfort, corresponding to an attack of anxious anticipation (apprehension of misfortune), assumes the character of terror if he sees a bird flying about in a room. Birds in the air also become objects of anxiety to him. The sight of birds flapping their wings is unendurable. He experiences intense fear at the possibility of a bird approaching him or hovering about him with the wings extended and moving up and down. The fear that a bird might perch on his shoulder is equally great.

The physician who treated him before me, a very competent and skilled psychotherapist, thought of the sexual significance of this phobia. The German vulgarism ("vögeln") for cohabitation suggested defences against sex and more especially against fellatoristic phantasies ("penis in ore").* The patient did not directly reject the interpretation, but neither did he accept it—and he experienced no relief.

When we question our patient about the commencement of his phobia he recalls certain important facts. He is reminded of a parrot that his family

*Freud has given us a thoroughgoing study ("A Childhood Memory of Leonardo da Vinci's," pp. 25-6) of the significance of this phantasy in connection with the pleasurable memories of sucking the mother's breast. As to the bird as a sexual symbol cf. F. S. Krauss in the *Internat. Zeitschr. f. ärzt. Psa.* Vol. 1, p. 288; 1913.

owned and which was subsequently presented to one of his aunts. He had forgotten all about this bird until one day he suddenly saw it flying about in his aunt's residence. Filled with terror he begged the animal should be removed. He also recalls two "inséparables" [turtle-doves] that his family owned. He thinks that one of these died and that then the other one died, too. Finally it occurs to him that one of his aunts was photographed with a dove in her hand.

More important than this old material is the recollection of a remarkable impression he experienced lately and which repeats itself often. To make a short-cut from his home to his office he walks through the zoological garden—a practice that was made easy for him by the possession of a pass. Like all victims of phobias he was constantly contending with his fear and seeking to conquer it by practice and habit. A mysterious power seemed to draw him to the birds he feared so much. So he would pass the bird-houses every morning, trembling and quaking with fear and terror. Thus it happened that one morning he discovered a parrot whose peculiar expression and form reminded him of an old man. The stooping position, the care-worn face, the mournful look in the eyes—that was not a bird but a human being in the shape of a bird! He could not look at this bird without a shudder but he could not help looking at it again and again.

Before explaining this remarkable phenomenon we must describe two other phobias our patient suffered from. The first is a fear of falling in love. He has had this fear for twenty years. He had then made the acquaintance of a girl in a sanatorium who had been harassed and annoyed by her mother. He sympathized with her and, quick as a flash, fell in love with her while he was attempting to console her. But he took the precaution to make a remark before the girl's companion which would make the thought of marriage impossible. "He would remain a bachelor, would never get married, his circumstances precluded the possibility of marriage." Notwithstanding this, he feared, that his sympathetic attitude had given rise to the impression that he was wooing the girl. He shut himself up in his room and suffered such an attack of apprehension that his physician declared that he was suffering from "hysteria." After a few days he left the sanatorium and went home. But he was destined to meet the girl several times after that. He was always on the lookout not to give the impression that he was wooing her. He never visited her alone, sent her a letter of congratulations in partnership with his brother and once sent her some flowers bearing his own and his brother's visiting cards. But ever since then he is afraid of falling in love or of exposing himself to an impression that might "get" him. He did not dare look a woman in the face or speak to one. He is just as much afraid of falling in love with the manicure and the typist

as with the maid, the cook or the housekeeper. He must be especially on his guard against new female acquaintances. He is therefore very careful to walk or travel only along certain particular roads near his home and only in the company of his valet or his father or his physician. For short distances he can bear to be accompanied by a certain lady friend.

This woman is acceptable to him because he is quite sure he won't fall in love with her. He keeps her at a proper distance from him. In fact he did not choose her himself. His brother had found her. He had not staid a single night in her house. He only visits her occasionally and sleeps in her house, but without undressing. They exchange no confidences and do not speak in the language of intimates. Notwithstanding all this, he indulges in phantasies of marrying this girl for he considers her a very fine and respectable personage; and the absence of any likelihood of falling in love with her seems to offer great advantages. He is quite sure she will never "get" him. Perfect "potentia coeundi" with her; orgasms wholly satisfactory. In addition to this form of sexual indulgence, performed semi-weekly (on the advice of physicians—"as a hygienic measure"), he indulges in another mode of erotic gratification which has a thoroughly infantile character.

In his family's employ there is an elderly housekeeper by whom he loves to be petted. She sympathizes with him for his sufferings and when he is troubled with sleeplessness she strokes him like a little child till he falls asleep. This often results "in emission"—a form of gratification which recalls the playful practice of a governess whom they employed during his boyhood (between his eighth and thirteenth years) and who evidently had much to do with the genesis of his fear. She also was in the habit of playing "cum membrum virile." His present housekeeper thus only brings about a re-experiencing of a former pleasure.

Another circumstance gives our patient's case a peculiar aspect. He is impelled to bring all misfortunes into connection with his own guilt. If, for example, an acquaintance becomes afflicted with any ailment, e. g., pneumonia, he is compelled to search through his own whole past life to convince himself that he was in no way responsible for the ailment. Woe to him if he should find that his acquaintance had caught cold at some resort which he had recommended to him! or if he had advised him to consult a certain physician or undertaken a journey on his advice, or anything that did not turn out well! He therefore keeps the names of his physicians secret and never recommends them to his friends. So, too, he maintains a discreet silence when his advice is solicited about anything. In this way he saves himself from the possibility of holding himself responsible for anything that goes wrong.

If some indifferent neighbor, Mr. X, should die of the grippe, let us say, our patient's sufferings at once begin. He broods and worries. When had he last met Mr. X? What had he said to him? If he had not come personally in contact with Mr. X, he might have exerted his malign influence indirectly through the intervention of a mutual friend or acquaintance. He cannot find peace. For even after he has excluded all possibilities, there yet remains the horrible possibility of something uncertain and inexplicable to accuse him and make him feel responsible. In some manner or other he must have had a share in bringing the misfortune about!

This peculiarity is associated with another one. He cherishes a secret belief that a business must fail if he predicts failure for it. E. g., his firm contemplates opening a branch office; he is opposed to the plan but is out-voted. Then he gets the conviction that it cannot succeed and, as a matter of fact, *in all such instances the venture failed.*

He is frank to admit that he really *wished* such ventures to fail and that these wishes of his always came true. His predictions are the wishes of an oversensitive, envious, revengeful, malicious and ambitious man who will not acknowledge harboring such hateful desires and who devotes himself to doing deeds of kindness and to showing evidences of sympathy on every possible occasion so as to be able again and again to reassure himself as to his good-heartedness. His exaggerated ambition is being fed by a depressing feeling of inferiority resulting from a malady which cripples him and makes of him only half a man. What would he not accomplish if he were well? But his sickness also does away with the necessity of accomplishing something great and he can continue to cherish his secret belief in his "great historic mission." But he looks with envy on the achievements of others, especially his brothers' (whose health, energy and joy in life oppress him sorely when he compares his poor self with them). Some of these brothers do not treat him well and do not believe in his illness, declaring it altogether imaginary.

His neurosis is a sacred thing with him and any doubt concerning it he looks upon as a great crime. His whole life is a conflict with his malady.

But he knows that no one may insult or humiliate him with impunity. Such offences always bring illness or some other grave misfortune to his wronger. Why, even his mere thought that something bad might happen—and how often does his resentment express itself in such a wish!—results in something bad happening.

He cherishes a secret belief in the omnipotency of his ideas. Deep within the inner recesses of his soul he is revengeful, egotistic, and never forgets an

injury done him. As we have previously remarked, he is intensely ambitious and is always conscious of a feeling of humiliation. His father treats him as if he were still a boy; his brothers make merry about him and his sister has no respect for him. But he would be the first in his family. He hungers for recognition and love, especially from his father (who "makes him the goat" for everything and discharges all his unpleasantness on him). It is not unusual for his father to say to him, a man of forty-one: "You are a snot-nose! You don't understand anything!"

But he does not assume a bold front before his father or say anything to him in reply that might put the old gentleman in a temper. For if his father were to get an apoplectic fit he would reproach himself all his life. He would then be responsible for his father's death!

To an analyst it is quite evident that this man's attitude toward his father is bipolar. He loves him and hates him, trembles for his life and longs for his death, even if for no other reason than that he might be the uncontrolled head of their business. He maintains that his father is not sufficiently affectionate and he cajoles his physicians to make it clear to his father that he (the son) is very sick and that excitement of any kind is very likely to be fraught with serious consequences. All his life he has not known a single happy moment! He is always sick, always suffering and does not know what it is to be happy. Only God knows how great his sufferings are!

His attitude toward his father is reflected in certain features of his neurosis. He cannot live without an automobile. He is uneasy if the auto is not in front of his door. If his father does not come to the store he is miserable and his fears rise to intense proportions. Now and then his father "catches cold." When that happens he is wretched. If his father is at the office he can send the auto home. But at times he becomes so terribly afraid—of nothing in particular—that his father must hold both his hands. All his thoughts centre around the auto: is it in front of the door? does it contain enough gasoline? is the chauffeur near?

These compulsive thoughts emanate from his fear of losing his poor old father. If his father does not show up at the office he must have his auto. But not because the presence of his father means protection against his apprehension but because he lives under the dominance of a definite fantasy and expectation. This expectation seems to be linked up with his youth. If his father is not at the office he must have the auto because he expects to be informed any second that the old man is very sick, that he had a stroke or that some other misfortune happened to him. In that event he would

need the auto at once to go to him and get him medical aid. He could attend to all sorts of things at once and would have no cause for self-reproach later.

His agonizing feeling of guilt emanates from his wishes for his father's death. His neurosis is his self-inflicted punishment for his wicked desires. For, notwithstanding his wealth, he lives like a prisoner in a gilded cage.

We also learn that ever since his childhood he had been ill-treated by his father, whereas his mother had always been kind and loving to him.

And now we are ready for the analysis of his bird-phobia. One aspect of his neurosis—his fear of fluttering birds—is easily explained by reference to a memory of something in his earliest childhood. Among the Jews there is a religious custom called "Kaporah-schlagen," [i. e., rendering up a sacrifice]. A day or so before the Day of Atonement each member of the family swings a chicken about his head three times, saying at the same time a prayer and terminating the ceremony with the exclamation: "Life to me and death to you!" This is the Kaporah-hen, the sacrifice offered up to an angry (but appeasable) deity. As a rule every member of the family has his own hen or rooster, adults a large one and children a small one, but occasionally—for economic reasons—two or three children may have one chicken among them. (The bird of death!) This scene always made a profound impression on our patient [as it does on most children of a sensitive nature]. On one of these occasions he must have suddenly had the thought: "I hope my father or my brother dies!" To our patient every death is a Kaporah. When someone dies, be it a stranger or an acquaintance, he thinks: "Lucky it isn't I!" He wishes that all his enemies and those whom he envies may die, so much delight does he take in others' misfortunes. The flapping wings of birds remind him of Kaporahs and his earliest criminal, egoistic and malicious desires.

With this the recollection of the "inséparables" [turtle-doves] becomes clear. He had been told that these birds love each other so much that on the death of one partner the other one dies from grief. And this seemed to have been the case with the birds they had owned; at any rate, he has faint recollections of something of the sort.

He loved his mother and hated his father. His earliest memory points to this. As we now know, the earliest memories—the so-called "covering memories" (Freud)—manifest the most important childhood experience, the child's first attitude, its relationship to the world and to its immediate environment. This recollection of his is somewhat as follows:

I am standing in front of a jewelry store and admiring a pair of ear-rings

with big red stones. I am thinking: I am going to buy my mother these earrings when I am big and have a lot of money.

Another such infantile memory also pertains to his mother: *I am looking at a big house and saying: "I'll buy my mother that." My brother objects that the house is too dirty and says he will buy mother a much nicer house.*

These two memories suffice to show that he wished to lay all earth's treasures at his mother's feet. His parents were very affectionate to each other. He can recall only a single quarrel between them, and that was later on when his father refused to admit our patient's illness when his mother contended that something ought to be done for him and that perhaps he ought to be sent to a sanatorium. He had always been a sickly child and his mother had therefore always been very affectionate to him. . . .

His parents were the turtle-doves. He had never known a happier couple. His secret thoughts of his father's death could not but remind him of the turtle-doves and conjure up before his mind's eye the frightful vision of his mother following her husband into the grave. Such a love seemed to him a frightful thing. No wonder then that he was afraid of falling in love!

Another thing that now becomes clear is the matter about the "Papagei" [a German word for a species of parrot]. The Papagei is his "papa." In reply to my question: "How long does a Papagei live?" he promptly says: "Oh, very long—sixty to seventy years!"

The parrot reminds him of his aged father and awakes his conscience. His terror is his fear of his evil thoughts. His phobia is a punishment for and a protective measure against his evil desires. For he is so pre-occupied with his fears that he can think of nothing else.

He is consumed with a desire for love. It is the dream of his life to love and to be loved. At the same time, by virtue of the law of bipolarity, he is afraid of love. (To die on the death of the beloved!) Besides, his polygamous ideas (he is a collector and a fantasy Don Juan) resent a permanent union. To love one woman is to lose all others. But even in his early youth he had had two women: his governess and his mother. By a clever bit of mental jugglery his "lady-friend" takes the place of his mother and his housekeeper becomes his governess. In this way he again has his two women who look out for him and are affectionate to him, but he has so chosen them that he is not emotionally bound to them and need not be concerned about love. If his "friend" should die, his brother would find him another—and his housekeeper,

too, is replaceable. Both are replaceable. He would not have to die after either of them. He is not bound and all possibilities are open before him.

In his bird-phobia his guilty conscience finds a vent. The Kaporah-bird stands before him like an everlasting warning, reminding him of his wickedness and filling him with the fear of God's vengeance. His fear of death is the fear of making his audit after death. God knows and sees all, even his wicked thoughts.

The invalid insists that he is not pious and is not at all concerned about God or religion. But on being hard pressed, he is forced to admit that before he falls asleep he murmurs to himself the poor remnants of a Hebrew prayer and of some childish prayers. He keeps the Day of Atonement in memory by means of his own private fast-days and days of repentance. Experience has taught him that the attacks of apprehension are associated with his stomach. He cannot bear to eat. Fasting brings relief from his symptoms. Often he can free himself from apprehension only by dedicating three or four days to fasting. Of course these fast-days also have a religious significance and are substitutes for such fast-days, e. g., the Day of Atonement, as he fails to keep. His whole malady has an air or touch of finality about it. He is really preparing for the great scene of justification on the Judgment Day. What has his whole life been? Grief, apprehension, pain and suffering! We now understand why he says that all his life he has not known a single happy moment. His life is one of continuous suffering as a punishment for his longings for other people's death. Only God knows how much he suffers, inasmuch as he enacts his woes in the name of God before whom he plays the rôle of the permanent invalid, Lazarus, Job.

It is noteworthy that by swallowing large quantities of air he can bring his attacks on—attacks which may be very distressing and present to us the spectacle of a man pale as death, panting for breath and bathed in perspiration. We observe in him the familiar, deep, sobbing inspiration characteristic of the air-hungry neurotic, as well as the trick of pumping air into his stomach by swallowing and chewing. By elevating the diaphragm he gets the feeling of abdominal tension and pressure about the heart to such an extent that he must unbutton his trousers and loosen his waistcoat.

All sorts of symptomatic acts and utterances manifest a strong homosexual component which serves to account for his bipolar attitude toward his father. In a childishly spiteful way he desires his father to treat him with the affectionate caresses he (the son) gets from the housekeeper. From his physicians, too, he expects attentions and he makes it his boast that all his physicians

are his friends. He takes infinite pains to describe and elucidate his malady and is always on the hunt for some one who will understand him. But in truth he is striving in every way to obscure the true motives of his neurosis and to cover it up by turning his symptoms into their opposites. He flees from the truth and manifests that secret pride in his malady which characterizes all rich and original neurotics whom "countless distinguished physicians have failed to cure."

He has not told a single physician his secret belief in the omnipotency of his thoughts. He is himself a bird of death; he is the raven that bodes ill to all. In birds he fears and detests his inner self, the cruel, malicious, envious ego, the ill-omened raven that always bodes evil because it wishes evil to all the world.

Without question the strong impression made on him by the "Kaporah" ceremony had a decisive influence in determining the structure of his neurosis. Ever since his childhood he has suffered from apprehensions. Children's fears (which are so very common and which nevertheless escape the attention of most pediatricists) are the precursors of the phobias of adults. Their study would be repaid by a better understanding of all phobias. I have in mind Dr. Abraham's brief communication (*Int. Zeitschr. f. ärzt. Psa.* 1913, I, 256.) on "the psychogenesis of children's fear of the street." He tells us of a five-year-old boy who had the two forms of fear that our patient too had in his childhood. He can't remain home alone and cannot go out for a walk without his mother. He can't even go to his relatives though they live only across the street from him. He cannot go out even with his governess and gives the following reason: "I don't want to be a promenade baby! I want to be a mother's child!" On one occasion when his father went on a journey, he was permitted to sleep with his mother. When his father came back the youngster said to his mother: "It would be so much nicer if papa didn't come home!"

Such observations explain the origin of wishes for the death of fathers. From some of his occasional utterances we are justified in assuming that similar wishes had their habitation in our patient's bosom. His attitude towards his father and his behavior with respect to him confirm this assumption and lend it a great degree of probability. His "bird phobia"—whose homosexual significance I do not mean to call in question—shows us his "idée fixe" (Janet). Unceasingly and everlastingly the black bird of death hovers about his father's head and serves as a reminder of the fact that "nature's copy is not eterne" in that begotter for whose life he trembles, trembles with an intensity commensurable with the longing for his money and the inheritance of his power.

This case explains to us the psychic mechanism of apprehensive anticipation. The phobic awaits a misfortune, longs for it and fears it. He trembles for

its fulfilment and longs for it and fears it; trembles for fulfilment but still longs for it. Then he takes refuge from the conflict by flight into the certain prison-house of his malady.*

*This case bears great similarity to the bell-phobia of one of Dr. Morton Prince's patients (*Cf. Journ. of Abnorm. Psychol.*, Vol. viii.): A woman of forty is afraid of church towers. By the aid of hypnosis it is discovered that she heard church bells ringing while her mother was undergoing a serious operation. She prayed devoutly and hated the bells that pealed out so loudly. Her bipolar attitude toward her mother manifests itself in a feeling of guiltiness even with regards to other people. Because of this she looks upon herself as ugly and feels very inferior. As an everlasting warning to her these bells waken in her memories of the hateful, ugly thoughts that occupied her during her mother's operation. This points clearly enough to a secret belief in the omnipotency of her thoughts.—*W. S.*

(*Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum.*)

The Affective Basis of Intelligence

(Criticism of a study by Eugenio Rignano)

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Under the title *The Pathology of Reason* *Eugenio Rignano has recently published a rather paradoxical but thought-provoking study which directs attention to a too much neglected factor in the intellect—its affectivity.

Rignano's work takes its departure from an examination of sleep and dreams. He asserts that these two related phenomena have a common cause, which may roughly be termed fatigue. If hitherto the nature of dreams has not been well understood, it is because the commonplace fact of the relation between sleep and dreams has been insufficiently studied. Investigators have gone too far afield in their search for the cause of dreams—the cause being quite simply the "sleep of the mind" (*le sommeil de l'esprit*). And this sleep, like all sleep, is the consequence of fatigue—in this case, mental fatigue. Properly not fatigue of the intellect, however, since—and this is our author's ingenious and paradoxical thesis—it is not the intellect but the affectivity which becomes fatigued during the course of the day. Affectivity, he says, is the only faculty which is constantly awake from morning till night. In the forms of desire or of fear (more specifically, the fear of being deceived) it accompanies or precedes all our acts; throughout the day it does not know a single moment of respite. During the night, however, it rests; we then cease loving and hating, desiring and fearing. Now this absence of the affective life during sleep brings about an important transformation in the psyche; this transformation, Rignano holds, is none other than the dream. The fear of being deceived, constantly on the alert during our waking hours, is the necessary condition for common sense in both our speech and actions. Like all affectivity, this fear disappears during sleep; and with it, common sense disappears. Hence the *illogical character* of

**La Pathologie du raisonnement*, in *Revue Scientia* (Milan), November and December, 1919, January, 1920.

our dreams. In the same way, all interest disappears, and images, no longer provided with centres of attraction about which they may gather, crowd one another in bizarre confusion. Hence the *incoherent character* of our dreams. Lack of logic, incoherence—these are the two most striking characteristics of dreams. Both are to be explained, Rignano asserts, by the absence of affectivity during sleep. The author also maintains, in passing, that the dream is an intrinsic refutation of the association-theory, which postulates that judgment and reason result automatically from the play of mental images. For mental images are present in dreams; they occur in such abundance that they fairly jostle one another; but the kaleidoscope, turn as it will, turns to no purpose—the images are incapable of organizing themselves into the regular patterns of judgment and reason. Why? Because no emotion is present to guide them. Emotion, affectivity, is the only shepherd able to control the gamboling flock of images. If this shepherd be absent, anarchy results. It follows, therefore, that the elementary forms of mental life do not suffice to determine the higher forms, although the association-theory would have us believe that they do. For the transition from the lower to the higher forms, the goad of affectivity is essential.

There exists, says our author, an *a posteriori* confirmation of the non-affectivity of dreams. We all know that in our dreams we may find ourselves in the most paradoxical situations conceivable and yet accept them as commonplace; the greatest perils may leave us utterly unmoved. In short, objects and situations which would profoundly disturb us in our waking state do not at all disturb us in our dreams. Besides, we often dream of matters that have occupied us least during the day.

Passing from the subject of dreams to that of insanity, and bearing in mind the frequently noted resemblances between these two states, Rignano wonders whether there may not be found at the bottom of insanity conditions analogous to those determining the dream. And, indeed, an examination from this point of view of the various forms of insanity leads him to the conclusion that, contrary to the general view, insanity is essentially characterized not by disturbances of the intellect but by disturbances of affectivity.

But here our author confronts us with a subdivision, wherein we encounter two forms of insanity:

(1) In *paranoia* we observe an affective exclusiveness: the whole sum of the patient's interest turns in an exaggerated fashion toward a few limited objects; to everything else he remains indifferent. As a consequence of this mono-affectivity we find a mono-idea-ism, monomania. But the basis of this peculiar condition is a disturbance of the affectivity. It is not the intelligence,

properly speaking, that is sick, as is testified by the extreme coherence of the reasoning processes of monomaniacs. They reason excellently, but they are master-reasoners destitute of common sense—as Pascal might have put it, they have a splendid “head for geometry” but no head at all for “finesse.” Their lack of common sense is due to the fact that the “fear of being deceived,” the impulse (*tendance*) for control, is held in check by the exaggeration of some other affective impulse which has become their sole concern. According to Tanzi and Lugaro (cited by Rignano) “there is to be found among paranoiacs, in addition to the exuberance of affective activity (*moteur passionnel*), a constitutional defect of the critical faculty.” These contrasting traits Rignano expresses schematically by saying that *paranoiacs are coherent and illogical*. They afford a unique instance of the dissociation of coherence and logic, qualities frequently confused but rendered quite distinguishable by this particular condition. Paranoia is sometimes and very appropriately called “the reasoning madness” (*folie raisonnante*). Whenever it seems that the intellect of a paranoiac has remained intact, it will be found that other interests have for the time being lured him away from his dominant affectivity, his *idée fixe*. Under such circumstances, an observer who had not been forewarned would find it very difficult to realize that he was dealing with a madman.

(2) In *other forms of insanity*, on the other hand, both coherence and logic are disturbed. Like dreams, these insanities are thus characterized by *both incoherence and lack of logic*. And, in a general way, this condition originates in an insufficient affectivity, and not, as some have thought, in an exaggerated affectivity.

(a) Sometimes this insufficiency takes the form of an *affective instability*. This is the condition which obtains in manics, in whom the stream of successive impressions flows without let or guidance, so that there ensues a perpetual mobility, a perpetual displacement of interest. The picture has been well drawn by Kraepelin*: “Hardly has she been persuaded to sit down, than she leaps up again, hurls her slippers away, throws off her apron, and begins to sing and dance. Suddenly she pauses, clasps her hands, goes to the blackboard, takes a piece of chalk, begins to write her name but ends by making a tremendous flourish which in an instant fills almost the whole blackboard. This writing she then effaces superficially with a sponge, begins again to write in great haste some letters of the alphabet, but suddenly hurls the chalk over the heads of the observers, etc. . . .”

*Kraepelin: *Einführung in die psychiatrische Klinik* [Introduction to Clinical Psychiatry]. Barth, Leipsic. 1901.

(b) Sometimes—as among victims of confused mania (*confus*)—the disturbance is really an *affectivity incapacity*; and this powerlessness, this lack of interest, manifests itself intellectually as an inability to organize ideas, to tell head from tail. Intellectual activity is painful; the patient flounders about as though in the heavy atmosphere of a nightmare in which one cannot solve even the simplest problems.

(c) Finally, among the demented (*déments*), there is a *complete absence of affective impulse*. According to the studies of Masselon (*La démence précoce* [Dementia Precox]. Joanin, Paris. 1904.) in these patients “emotions disappear very soon, family affections being among the first to fade out.” And this affective enfeeblement “precedes or dominates the intellectual impairment.” A total loss or cessation of emotion is often observable in the demented. The visits of friends and relatives arouse in them neither pleasure nor pain. Things that would call forth vivid emotions in others leave the demented indifferent. If such a patient be told that he is soon to leave the asylum, he manifests not the least sign of joy, his pulse beats no whit more rapidly. In these cases, especially if the affectivity recedes to still lower levels, sometimes reaching even absolute zero, all intellectual life likewise disappears (*idiocy*). “If the signs of affective activity wholly disappear, the significance of all things whatsoever also disappears, and therewith all thought ceases. The patient is then restricted to a purely plant-like life, reduced to a mere mechanism or reflexes, forever deprived of the least ray of reason.” Or else, such thought as remains is utterly incoherent and illogical. The dement is the only insane type thoroughly comparable to a person who is dreaming—in both there is a complete absence of affectivity.

From all the foregoing considerations, Rignano arrives at an original conception of mental equilibrium. At bottom, he holds, mental equilibrium is nothing else than an affective equilibrium. Schematically, this equilibrium may be represented as an equilibrium between two essential forces:

- (1) the positive affective force, *interest*, which impels us to reason, which permits images to gather about fixed centres and thus insures *coherence*;
- (2) the negative affective force, *control*, the fear of being deceived, which is the necessary condition for *common sense and logic*.

II.

There is apparent in this theory a strenuous effort toward simplification and synthesis. That is its merit. But, as it appears to us, this effort at simplification, as is so frequently the case in efforts of this kind, has sacrificed or

distorted certain facts. In fact, there are several observations in this connection which seem inevitable.

The very simple idea of considering dreams as the manifestation of psychic fatigue is an excellent one—one which seems self-evident once it has been propounded. But it appears to us that the author takes up an untenable position when he seeks to interpret this fatigue as a fatigue of affectivity. The paradox is brilliantly carried off, but—it remains a paradox. Would it not be simpler to hold that that which is fatigued is *effort*? The absence of effort, it would seem, quite satisfactorily explains the mental transformations presented by dreams. Voluntary attention is wanting in dreams, and as a consequence all rational activity (of which attention is the primary condition) is likewise wanting. It is the common experience that it is effort that is subject to fatigue. Particularly is it not evident why affectivity should be more subject to fatigue than ideational activity. It may be that there is no respite for the affective life throughout the day; but it is certainly more evident that sensational life is just as constantly active, and it would be just as possible to hold that it is the sensory function which is subject to fatigue—that sleep seals our senses.

We wish to point out, however, that in maintaining that sleeping and dreaming are characterized by a suspension of effort we are not necessarily assuming a position diametrically opposed to Rignano's point of view, which postulates a suspension of the affectivity. For, as a matter of fact, there can be no effort unless one is impelled to act by desire, by fear, by some affective state. Affectivity and effort are closely allied. Yet—and it is at this point that confusion may become serious—although affectivity may be a necessary condition of effort, the converse is by no means true. Although one cannot act without feeling, one can feel without acting. In other words, the absence of affectivity involves absence of effort, but the absence of effort does not necessarily involve absence of affectivity. Rignano ingeniously and justly, as it seems to us, distinguishes two modes in which sleep may be produced. In the one, sleep results from what is properly called fatigue; in the other, sleep results from ennui, from lack of interest.* In the latter case it is indeed the absence of interest, of affectivity, which brings about suspension of effort. In the former case, however, we have quite simply an automatic suspension of effort because of fatigue, with affectivity in no way involved. Thus there is no *a priori* justification for the assumption of an absence of affectivity during sleep and dreams.

A posteriori, the affectivity of dreams is, on the contrary, an empirical fact that cannot be denied. Rignano has not sufficiently considered the common

enough phenomenon known as the "nightmare," the affective content of which is obvious, and in which the intensity of the emotions experienced may surpass any the subject ordinarily experiences in his waking hours. Even if we admit, as Rignano would have us do, that the nightmare is a translation of kinesthesias (oppression, indigestion, etc.), its affective nature is none the less a fact. Further, one can easily convince oneself of the probably continuous affective undertone which accompanies dreams, causing us to re-live, more vividly sometimes than in real life, emotions that have been experienced in reality. We weep in our dreams, and love, and hate, and fear. If it be true that there are things which would disturb us in our waking hours but do not disturb us in our dreams, the converse also is true: in dreams we may fear things which are intrinsically inoffensive.

The Freudian theory, which Rignano rejects somewhat hastily, regards dreaming as an essentially active process and maintains that behind the manifest elements of the dream there lie hidden emotions. It is to be understood, of course, that "repression" is an interpretative hypothesis—a very fertile one, however. It is "as if" the dream conceals repressed emotions; and this "as if" is worth considering. Yet it is not necessary to rely upon these hidden emotions in order to be convinced of the affectivity of dreams, for dreams are by no means destitute of affects of a manifest sort. Even a crushing refutation of the Freudian theory would not invalidate the empirical fact of the affectivity of dreams. The denial of this fact constitutes the essential weakness of Rignano's theory, which in other respects is happier.

As it appears to us, it is not essential to Rignano's theory as a whole that it deny the affectivity of dreams. Rignano's theory would perhaps display an even greater unity were the author disposed to admit an even closer parallel between insanity and dreams. Viewing insanity from the standpoint of affectivity, he distinguishes several markedly distinct varieties; he might be able to discover the same types in dreams, as well. He would find that at times dreams—like the paranoiac—are coherent and illogical, coherent precisely by virtue of a mono-affectivity, which is nothing more nor less than the Freudian theory. He could also find dreams analogous to the manic and the confused, with affective instability or impotence. At all events, the study of dreams is more favorable to this interpretation than to an interpretation which assimilates the dream to dementia precox only and which characterizes both by a non-affectivity.

But our criticism has not affected the core of Rignano's theory, which is primarily concerned with explaining intelligence by affectivity. There can be

no doubt that his theory assumes at times excessive and above all paradoxical forms (perhaps intentionally), as when we read, for instance:

"The two fundamental characteristics of this process (reasoning), the highest and most complex of all psychic processes, namely, coherence and logic, are truly and exclusively affective in origin."

To make of reasoning an affective act is certainly a bit daring. And yet, when all allowance is made for the paradoxical, a theory which emphasizes the importance of affectivity for the intelligence is not without its suggestiveness and well in line with the trend of contemporary psychology.

Ribot had already pointed out the importance of *tendance*, that is, of affectivity, in the fundamental phenomenon of intelligence, namely, attention. Rignano insists on this aspect of attention, seeing in it an equilibrium between positive affectivity, or interest, and negative affectivity, or control. This bipolarity of attention, it should be noted, squares very well with what we know about the "rhythm" of attention, which has been described as the subject's perpetual approach toward and recession from the object. Positive affectivity, interest, pushes us, as it were, toward the object; negative affectivity, control, leads us back to ourselves and impels us to compare the new object with our previous perceptions.

Richet was led to the conclusion that the "development of the emotional system (*système sensitif*) reveals a correlation with the development of the intellectual powers" and that "it is almost possible to measure the intelligence of an individual by his sensibility."* This conclusion runs counter to accepted opinion and seems to contradict the observations of Binet,** for instance, who found, as a result of his studies, that children may be divided into two clearly marked types which may be called "the literary" and "the scientific," the one more emotional and imaginative, the other more logical and cold. But it is not in the least necessary to refer to these laboratory data; ordinary observation will show us individuals of an excessive sensibility in whom the sensibility harms rather than serves the intelligence, as, for example, in the mythomania of hysterics. Because of this contradiction, it has been difficult to accept Richet's conclusion literally, though it, too, was based on exact observations. Rignano's theory, however, does away with this contradiction and permits a rectification of Rignano's assertion. The distinction between "coherence" and "logic" (not a very happy choice of terms, by the way) is well worth while, as is also the parallel distinction between a positive affectivity (interest) and a negative affectivity (control). Thus we come to this point of view:

*Charles Richet: *Etudes cliniques sur la sensibilité* (Clinical Studies of Sensibility).

**Binet: *L'étude expérimentale de l'intelligence* (The Experimental Study of Intelligence). Schleicher, Paris. 1903.

Affectivity is a necessary condition of intelligence, but not its sufficient condition. Truly objective intelligence depends on a perfect *equilibrium* between the two affectivities mentioned. This equilibrium is very unstable; it is not necessary to resort to the extreme instance of the paranoiac by way of illustration, for it is patent enough that the normal individual under the impact of a violent and exclusive emotion, a passion, loses control, collects all the motives which justify his emotion—if he is jealous he accepts without question all the “evidence” he can find of a betrayal which exists only in his imagination. It is when one is under the domination of an excluding emotion that “one tells oneself stories.” Nevertheless, a fact of prime importance remains: *a lively affectivity is essential for a great intelligence*,—an observation which meets excellently the demand for synthesis so characteristic of our time, when the true savant turns more and more from pedantry and no longer regards the artist, for example, with the old easy contempt, while among artists Goethe’s and Lionardo da Vinci’s ideal of universality is finding renewed favor.*

Manifestly, then, there is much that is valuable in Rignano’s idea, much that is in line with contemporary thought. What we find to criticize in our author’s theory of dreams is that he has not carried his idea far enough. We maintain that affectivity must be taken into account not only in the intellectual processes of judgment and reasoning, but also in the more rudimentary forms of the representational activity, of the imaginative processes, and, more particularly, in dreaming, with respect to which Rignano makes the error of not seeing the affectivity he reveals so clearly elsewhere. The Freudian theory, which he rejects, has precisely the merit that it finds in affectivity the condition and the explanation of the play of images, of dreams. Far from being opposed to Rignano’s fundamental theory, the Freudian theory parallels it.** Both theories emphasize the part played by affectivity in two different spheres of representational activity—the one in imagination, the other in discursive intelligence. They are mutually complementary.

*Cf. Romain Rolland: *Empédocle d’Agrigente*. Carmel, Geneva. 1918.

**We refer here to the Freudian theory only in the sense that it is a theory which seeks in affectivity the laws of the play of images. This aspect of the Freudian theory is certainly its least debatable aspect, and is perhaps admitted even by those who reject Freud’s major hypotheses.

(Translated from the French by G. F. Schulz)

The Origin and Meaning of the Symbolism of Freemasonry

By HERBERT SILBERER.

Vienna

II. THE SYMBOLISM OF BUILDING

Our study, which proceeds now to its more specific theme, the symbolism of freemasonry, cannot avoid a consideration of the symbolism of building in general, nor the query whence freemasonry acquired this more general symbolism of which its very name is eloquent. In other words, our immediate concern is with the source, not the origin, of this system of ideas, and it is reasonable to indulge this interest a little—but only a little, since historical research lies beyond the scope of our present task.

A threadbare but easy formula, still in vogue in some circles, has long been current to the effect that freemasonry dates from St. John's Eve, 1717, when, under the presidency of Anton Sayer, four English masonic lodges united to found the Grand Lodge of London. For those who are easily satisfied, this fact exhausts the question of the "development of freemasonry from the masonic trades." But those who wish to go deeper, who are interested in tracing the history not only of the idea but also of the living chain of those who transmitted it through the centuries, will demand wider horizons and longer perspectives.

Perhaps we shall most clearly grasp what happened in London in 1717 if we compare the occurrences at that place and time with the events that have just transpired in Austria.*

Our freemasonry, but recently granted official recognition, is by no means a brand-new affair. Rather is it the case of an institution of many years' standing which has but recently emerged into the light of publicity. And just this was the case in England, too, at the beginning of the 18th century; but with

*For the information of the readers of *Psyche and Eros* it is perhaps permissible to call attention to the fact that freemasonry, quiescent in Austria for a century because of imperial prohibition, was enabled to resume overt activity only with the birth of the Republic in the fall of 1918.

this difference—the emergence then was an event of much greater significance, inasmuch as the English lodges were the first in the world to take this step; besides, they emerged from a concealment that meant a great deal more than a similar obscuring would mean to-day. For, although freemasonry had been banished and forbidden here, in Austria, yet the prohibition did not involve the rack or the stake, as it did in the old days—when, indeed, it was not until the beginning of the 18th century and in a country that took the lead in the Enlightenment that emergence from the friendly shadows was at all possible.

Freemasonry, or what to-day bears the name, was a venerable and ancient institution even in 1717; nor were those four lodges in London the only lodges, or the grand lodge then founded the only grand lodge, then in existence. Side by side with those already mentioned (which, placing themselves under the protection of the state, undertook the task of organizing freemasonry) there flourished a goodly number of other lodges and grand lodges; and these, though less conspicuous, are no less worthy of respect as pillars of the old structure. Some have perished independently; most of them, however, chose the path of affiliation, amalgamation. Nor would it be correct to think of the existence of such societies as confined to England. I mention this fact to indicate that the constellation at the beginning of the 18th century furnishes evidence of an evolution of freemasonry that was of long duration and by no means dependent on the masonic trades—a circumstance of no little importance for the symbols and their ideational content. Nevertheless, as the symbolism of building suggests, we find “freemasonry” as a cultural movement in intimate touch, during the most diverse epochs, with the art of building—a phenomenon whose manifold causes we shall refer to later on.

To begin with, let us note that the German name “Freimaurerei” is relatively recent. It is a literal translation of the English word “freemasonry.” But the “mason,” the “stone-mason,” really and originally corresponds to the German “Steinmetz.” It is the same word. Medieval building art, which produced our grandly towering cathedrals, was not in the hands of the “Maurer,” but of the artists of the calling, the “Steinmetzen,” who united in themselves the functions we assign to-day to the builder, the architect and the sculptor. It was among these “Steinmetzen,” to anticipate, that what is now known as “Freimaurerei” (freemasonry) was cherished. But in those far-off days the term “Maurer” was applied only to manual laborers—underlings, doubtless, of the “Steinmetzen.” In the German provinces, therefore, it was impossible for the term “Maurer” spontaneously to attain the significance it acquired there later by virtue of translation. In England, however, and in France and Italy as well, linguistic usage developed along other lines. In these countries the term “mason” was applied to the manual laborers also, a fact for which

the explanation has been offered that at an early date "Master manual laborers" were admitted into the lodges of the masons proper. Thus, whereas in Germany one spoke of "aufgefreiten Steinmetzen" (i. e., masons endowed with certain special privileges), in England those who assembled in the "construction huts" (lodges) were called "free masons." Now, as we shall soon see, the term "Steinmetz" was formerly used in Germany in a double sense; for the initiated it meant not only the vocation but also a spiritual ideal rather difficult to define. And at quite an early date the word "mason" acquired a similar esoteric meaning in England, too.

The fact that liberal thought—always menaced, and cruelly menaced, by the ungenerous powers of the state—happened to find shelter and encouragement among the builders (even if not among builders exclusively) is explicable on several grounds. In the first place, the organizations of stone-masons were rigidly maintained and exclusive, although also widespread and mobile; in the second, old traditions, into which we shall go later, were favorable; and in the third, the free, artistic atmosphere in which these builders did their work was congenial to the finer spirits. Thus the medieval masonic lodges are comparable to the various societies of artists that flourished during the Renaissance, which in their turn became sanctuaries of that secret and liberal cultural activity which may not venture unpunished into public places.

To be sure, by the time that the dawn of official freemasonry (translated at that period into German by the term "Freimaurerei") was happily announced, the strictly maintained medieval masonic organization had long become superfluous in the building trades. But England is par excellence the land of the pious preservation of old traditions. And to this piety we owe the long life of those forms which the "construction huts" or lodges passed on to spiritual and moralistic masonry, so that it was eventually possible for an external and formal development of the latter from the former perceptibly to transpire. Permit me, then, to proceed definitively to the earlier periods, which are obviously of great importance; and in so doing I shall depend for the details in large measure upon the masterly special studies in this field made by Dr. Ludwig Keller ("Geheimer Archivrat in Berlin"), to whom I am indebted also for many valuable personal suggestions.

There have come down to us from those early times specimen "Regulations" ("Ordnungen") governing masonic brotherhoods, in which is clearly apparent the great stress laid on keeping the "proceedings" secret—a measure which made it possible for the lodges to serve as asylums for persecuted liberal thought. The medieval building guilds, as well as their members, traveled from town to town, going wherever work was to be found. Consequently

they could not rest content with merely local organizations but required, rather, a general union of all those who know the "masonic uses and order." To insure the pursuit of their calling as a monopoly, they endeavored to limit the possession of their special knowledge by imposing secrecy; and, since the maintenance of a stern discipline was necessary to this end, the bond which united them all attained a solidarity unknown to other crafts. The fraternity acquired power, independence, respect. High-placed patrons of architecture, coming into contact with these workmen, felt drawn into more intimate relations with them. Members of noble families especially, desiring affiliation with a "guildhall," sought admission into the masonic organizations as "amateurs of the arts." Particularly were the followers of the so-called "liberal arts" ("artes liberales") glad to fraternize with the masons.

Members had to preserve strict secrecy. Even an apprentice had to swear to keep secret the sign and the grip—these were called "sign, password, and grip"—under penalty of "forfeiting the mason's craft." Candidates and master masons, too, assumed responsibilities commensurate with their degrees. Among the secrets of master masons belonged the appropriate building plan ("gerechter Steinmetzengrund"), that is, the basic rules governing the technique of construction. For it was the masters' work to draw up the plans for the apprentices to execute.

An essential peculiarity differentiated the older lodges (they kept losing prestige in Germany from the 16th century on) from the guilds of the allied building trades (bricklayers, carpenters, etc.) as well as of all other manual trades. Whereas the constitutions of the other craft-organizations were dependent upon revocable charters granted the guilds by the civil and provincial authorities, the lodges followed a "free art" and were subject to neither the guild-compulsion nor the immediate supervision of magistrates. Furthermore, whereas in other guilds only masters were entitled to seats, the apprentices belonging to separate brotherhoods, both apprentices and master masons sat in the masonic lodges, cultivating there the high-elaborated uses and passing judgment together. In the lodges the basic idea of brotherly equality was carried out more consistently than in other corporations: all men were brothers, called one another brother, and recognized only the authority of those they had themselves elected—the wardens, the masters, and the grand masters. At the head of each lodge was the worshipful master; subordinate to him were two wardens, two deacons and a speaker (orator, advocate) as well as eighteen other members (nine to each warden)—twice twelve persons in all. The lodge itself was in the shape of a longish rectangle, the narrow sides facing west and east. The master's seat was in the eastern end, the seats of the speaker and

the wardens in the western, those of the master masons ("sodales") along the southern side, and along the northern were ranged the places of those of lowest degree—the traveling apprentices.* The strictly ordered ceremonial of the lodges is evident, e. g., in the language used there, some of the obscurities of which have not yet been cleared up. The symbols most important for our purposes were drawn from geometry and mathematics, from the craft itself, from nature, and from the Holy Scriptures. To the first class belong the circle, the triangle, the square and the 24-inch gage, the pentagon, hexagon, polygon; further, numerals, the right angle, the point, the line, etc.; to the second belong the signs of the hammer, the compass, the protractor, the level, the plumb-line, the scales, the pillars, the ladder, the twisted cords, etc.; to the third category belong the rainbow, the flaming star, the sun, the leaves of the vine, the ears of corn, the rose, the sphere, the cut and uncut stone, the candelabra, etc. The symbols derived from the Bible seem for the most part to relate to the Revelation of St. John; in accordance with *Apoc.* 21, 16, the square seems to signify in symbolic language the "community of God" or the "New Jerusalem," in which the righteous and the saints are some day to assemble; the star, so often employed in the language of the lodge, seems to refer to *Apoc.* 8, 10. The Bible itself was the most sacred symbol of the fraternity.

An important circumstance for the proper comprehension of these images as veritable symbols is their undoubted manifold significance. Even at a rough glance they are seen to possess a threefold significance, since they served not only as intellectual symbols, but also to express ethico-religious ideas and even to incorporate vocational terms and rules. Thus the circle represents ethically the Divine Perfection, ritually the solidarity of the brotherhood, vocationally both the inherent structural principle and the office of the Master; the vertical represents the plumb-line and the unity of the Godhead, etc. But this is by no means all the meanings involved in these symbols. Their ethico-religious content in itself presupposes a certain condensation, and to this must be added an essential integration with the other elements (symbolism of building and of geometry), which we shall later examine. For the present we stress merely the existence of the ethico-religious content, as traditionally united to the structural images.

The language employed in the lodge reflects the character of the whole organization. I have already pointed out that the terms "Steinmetz" and "mason" possess double meanings, referring to both the followers of the "art" in the narrower sense, that is, those whose craft was building, and the devotees

*In American lodges the officers and their stations, etc., differ somewhat from Dr. Silberer's description.—Ed.

of that broader "art" of the spirit which even to-day freemasonry calls the "royal art," that is, as "*Weltanschauung*" [a philosophy of life] and its ethical application. The latter "art" concealed itself behind the former. In accordance with the needs of the age, the latter changed its protective garb from time to time, and just as in the 15th century this was afforded by the "master-builders" ("Steinmetzen"), so, if less generally, in the 16th century it was provided by the painters, in the 17th century by the engravers and the writers, and the 18th century by the "masons" ("Maurer")—a list which, however, does not exhaust the series.

The "*Weltanschauung*" that was founded on religious freedom, on an ethical code, the system we are here discussing, incorporated the spirit of persecuted non-church Christianity. The followers of the forbidden religions were compelled to discover a *modus vivendi* in some sort of worldly activity. Numberless people possessed two religions—one which they practiced openly, and a second in which they truly believed and which they cherished in secret. In general, the organization of the non-church Christians, and of other cultural associations, too, comprised, because of practical considerations which we shall explain psychologically, three steps or degrees of progress in the exercise of the "art," called respectively, the "initiates," the "advanced," and the "finished." If to this we add the fact that the creed aimed at the building of the Kingdom or the "temple" of God, it must be confessed that the organization and purpose of the lodges provided extraordinarily favorable conditions for the absorption of these movements as well as for the development of a symbolical language; and, apart from the threefold division into apprentices, fellow-crafts, and masters, the craft terminology and uses provided spontaneously, as it were, a rich symbolism for the idea of that Kingdom of God that it was the purpose of the old congregations to build. But we shall see that this second group of favorable conditions was by no means an accidental "find"; rather was it a kind of rediscovery and application of a treasure that had been stored away there ages before.

I have already called attention to the fact that the associations of builders were not the only, nor always the most prominent, sanctuaries of our higher "art" (in the sense of modern freemasonry). For example, the Academies of the Italian Renaissance, saturated with Platonism—in Rome, Florence, Venice, Milan, 15th-16th centuries—are characterized by those who have studied them as "classical freemason lodges"; and in this connection it should not be forgotten that the term "lodge" (*loggia*) there too signified the gathering-places (real lodges) of exclusive societies of this sort as well as the societies themselves. We shall have occasion to return to the concept of the "lodge" and its related image of the closed square. In these Academies the poetic art

played no small rôle along with the plastic. And in the 17th century, we find the linguistic societies and other bodies devoted to the widest diversity of arts serving purely "cultural" interests outwardly, but inwardly, in the exclusive inner circles, ideals of the sort to-day known as "Masonic." To this group belongs a society well known in German literary history, the *Teutscher Palmbaum*, and the grand lodge *Indissolubilis* with its presumably wide-branching organization throughout Germany and its undoubted kinship with the Italian academies; to this group must further be counted all sorts of Dutch artist-associations and "orders," as well as societies of musicians, engravers, alchemists. Volumes might be written on these organizations. Their symbolism, even though obscure, is extraordinarily suggestive for those who can read it. It is worth adding, *en passant*, that Dr. Ludwig Keller suspects similiar tendencies to have been active among the *Meistersinger*.

The intimate association of the "fremason" *Weltanschauung* with the symbolism of building is evident from the circumstance that the latter often accompanies the former even where there is no vocational justification. A remote vocational interest may be assumed in the *Compagnia della Cazzuola*, instanced by Keller as an example from the age of the Renaissance academies. It is said to have been founded at Florence in 1512; it provided for three grades or degrees (*adherenti, minori, maggiori*), and not only employed the trowel as its insignia but possessed an elaborate masonic ritual. The society included many artists (among them famous painters, e.g., Andrea del Sarto), architects, musicians; along with these, however, merchants, physicians, weavers, and others. As Vasari tells us, the fame of the society grew with the years. Its fêtes were widely known. The members (perhaps only those of the higher degrees) bore the sign of the trowel. The *Maggiori* carried a hammer, also. The *adherenti*, as assistants, bore a variety of masonic tools in their hands. But all were garbed in "abito di muratori e manovali"—with the apron and appurtenances. When in processional entrance they stepped into the "first room," the presiding officer laid a plan before them and gave them directions for the construction of a building; thereupon the "masters" took their places at a table and the "assistants" began the execution of the work. When the "masons" observed that a pedestal had not been well made, they tore it down and had a pillar brought, etc. The ceremony ended in a banquet. There seems to be much here, both in organization and in ritual, that may be referred to the academies, too. The banquet must not be thought of as a mere "dinner," but rather as a fraternal meal, a love-feast, the agape of ancient tradition. There are many indications that the academies of the Renaissance were not ignorant of other building-symbols. The most striking examples, however, are afforded by the linguistic and other academies of the 17th century, since among these

the circle, the protractor, the plumb-line, the spheres, the pillars, the steps, etc., could have possessed only a traditional significance. The Bible or the Opened Book is never wanting in the corpus of the pictures. Other important elements were the rectangle of the lodge with the accompanying idea of solidarity, and light, whether in the form of earthly modes of illumination or heavenly bodies, and likewise the significant symbolism of death.

The death-symbolism was not wanting in the society of the masonic trowel described above. On certain occasions the "muratori" assembled in a dimly lighted subterranean room in which everything was covered with black cloth: "here the gods of the underworld held sway." In this room were pictures of death, of martyrdom and of tortures. There were subterranean banquets, too, at which wine was drunk out of strangely shaped glasses. Food was served in the form of skeletons and bones. After the termination of such a ceremony the company again repaired to the upper chambers in which rich decorations had meanwhile been set up.

If we seek now to trace further the descent of our symbolism through the ages, we find that the most significant clues are afforded by the Italian academies of the Renaissance and the Middle Ages. Jealously distrusted by the Papal Church, these academies were dedicated to Platonism and a Platonizing Christianity; in the words of Ferdinand Gregorovius, they were "classical masonic lodges," not in spirit only but largely in form as well; and finally, these academies, as can be definitely demonstrated in the case of the one at Rome, appear to have had a vital relation to the catacombs, the cult and burial places both of the ancient philosophical schools and of the early Christians. At least this much is certain: the academy in Rome made use of the catacombs for its secret meetings—meetings which bore something of a cult character and which were conducted along lines and with the aid of a sign-language that were wholly in the spirit of the earlier frequenters of the catacombs. Nor was this spirit confined to the academy in Rome; in the form of Platonism, but under various protective disguises, it permeated all the sister-academies which cherished the Renaissance outlook. Clearly, then, these academies refer us in our quest back to the catacombs and what anciently took place in them. It seems probable, further, as Keller supposes, that there are historical connections between the academies of the 15th century and the Platonic Academies dissolved A. D. 529 by the Emperor Justinian. At the very least, these 15th century academies were certainly the spiritual heirs of the Platonic Academies.

But what do we find in the catacombs? What do their symbols tell us of the spirit of their ancient frequenters?

These rock-temples, which date back into pre-Christian eras and are

distributed over the whole extent of the ancient Roman Empire, so that they are to be found both along the Rhine and in Egypt, and in France, Italy, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, northern Africa, and Greece; these rock-temples, which lodged successively the followers of ancient mystic cults and the early Christians and the subsequent heretics, thus affording an asylum to a great human family which, forming a living chain through the ages, was subject to persecution by the state both because it was Christian and because it was not Christian, but always because it cherished a religion of spiritual and moral freedom; these subterranean structures reveal the existence of an ancient bond between this "free mason" spirit—to use the modern term—and a symbolism of building, of geometry, of death, of light. But, most pat to our purpose, they reveal this building symbolism in its origin and growth, in *statu nascendi*. For, along with the elaborated building and craft symbols, they have preserved the simpler symbols from which the former took their origin. It will be convenient to refer briefly to these simpler symbols as constituting a symbolism of sacred numbers, and to give them detailed consideration later on. For the present, we shall have to dwell a while upon the external forces making for a union between the philosophical-religious cult and the craft of building.

Time and time again—quite as though Destiny sought to give significance to an accidental symbolism of walls as a defence against the outer world—we find the suspect society assuming the mask of a masonic brotherhood as a protection against constituted authority. The early Christians (who were not the first link in the chain we are examining) did not always organize frankly as Christian congregations but contrived frequently to conceal their identity under the names of Roman "colleges" and similar associations. Practical possibilities for such concealment were especially afforded by the tolerated burial societies. The construction of subterranean chambers was associated with the craft of stone-cutters and masons; it is not remarkable, therefore, that the outer form of the stone-cutters' associations commended itself to these congregations and came in time to be adopted by them. Indeed, the "colleges" of the *fossore*s and *latomi* became vitally significant for our secret societies, as may be observed at that juncture when Christianity, immediately upon its adoption as the state-religion, in its turn persecuted the heretical brotherhoods which functioned in an older and philosophically liberal spirit. Many were the colleges that were then suppressed by the state. But the state had to permit those associations which actually constructed the catacombs to continue; it had to tolerate the colleges of the *fossore*s as long as it continued to find catacombs desirable as burial places. In this way it was possible for the old rites, the old belief, to be propagated under the cloak of a masons' society. "It is scarcely probable," says our frequently cited Dr. Keller, "that this transformation took place

everywhere to the same extent; those who were persecuted may possibly have assumed other disguises, according to the circumstances,—under certain conditions, an appropriate concealment was afforded, for example, by literary societies. But the fact of the transformation itself, however, as well as its approximate date, is established by remarkable testimony: at the time when the name *domus aeterna* (House of Eternity), originally proper to the ancient philosophical schools, began to fall into disuse, the name *latomium* (masons' workshop) began to emerge, surviving far into ecclesiastical Christian times. This latter term was used in precisely the transferred sense of a "cult-place" in which, centuries later, the term 'lodge' was employed."

I wish to call attention, in passing, to the fact that there was a term, older even than the name *domus aeterna*, which designated the subterranean temple as *heroon*, and that the most famous *heroon* was the one belonging to the Academy selected by Plato for the scene of his teaching activity and made by him the prototype of all academies dedicated to his teachings and to the Platonic cult. The terms *domus aeterna*, *oikos aionios*, and the synonymous *arca* (ark) designated both the sanctuary and the associated brotherhood, the usage paralleling the present double sense of the word "church." The symbol for the House of Aeons is a rectangle, occasionally crowned with a triangular gable in the field of which are frequently found three roses, also arranged in the form of a triangle; with this latter circumstance and with the festival use there made of roses (to be discussed later) is connected the term *rosarium*—a term which enjoyed long life, making its way into ecclesiastical terminology in the sense of *koimeterium*.

About the time of Emperor Constantine, the name *domus aeterna* fell under suspicion; and in the degree that the term *latomium* became prominent, these symbols, originally of a purely geometrical nature, underwent conversion into images of analogous shapes derived from the building craft. Thus we can see how an older symbolical language, which we may roughly designate as Pythagorean, assumed the cloak of a building and tool symbolism: arrived at this point in our search for "origins," we are in a position to study an instance of "genesis." It should be noted that this fusion and growth process does not consist in an addition of a purely external (accidental, in the sense of non-related) sort, but is an organic development. And this development is an enrichment, not a dilution. And it is important, too, to emphasize the fact that in the building-symbolism itself there is inherent something which predestined it to the use with which we are familiar and which had led to similar uses even in ancient times. It was not without intention that I have referred to the terms *oikos*, *domus*, etc., as of antecedent origin.

Thus we find that there are two—perhaps three—important sources for the blending or contamination of the geometrical symbols employed by the philosophy

of antiquity with images derived from the building craft, the union resulting in symbolical abbreviations for ideas of an ethico-religious *Weltanschauung*:

The first, externally probably the most striking source, is the need for protection—a need which has been sufficiently dwelt upon in the foregoing.

The second source is implicit in the relation that must exist between the design of a temple and the needs of its cult: clearly, a proper temple must be so disposed as to fit the cult, to express the spirit of the ceremonies solemnised therein. If this need does not immediately appeal to the reader, let him turn to the Biblical description of the building of Solomon's temple! Let him recall how elsewhere in the Bible the image of the building of a house is significantly applied! How easy it must have been for the Christian congregations, entering in the *koimiteria* into the heritage of their philosophical predecessors, to develop this latent building symbolism when passages such as the following were engraved on their hearts: "So then ye are no more strangers and sojourners, but ye are fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God (in the *oikos aionios!*), being built upon the foundation of the apostles and the prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone; in whom each several building, fitly framed together, groweth into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God in the Spirit" (*Ephesians*, 2. 19). "If any man destroyeth the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are" (*I Cor.* 3. 10). In these sayings, St. Paul, who occasionally refers to himself as a "masterbuilder" (*I Cor.* 3. 10), makes use of images which we encounter in the words of Christ himself: Did ye never read in the scriptures, the stone which the builders rejected, the same was made head of the corner? . . . Therefore say I unto you: The kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and shall be given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof. And he that falleth on this stone shall be broken to pieces: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will scatter him as dust." (*Matth.* 21. 42 ff.) "Upon this rock I will build my church" (*Matth.* 16. 18). The same language is employed in *I Petr.* 2. 5.: "Ye also, as living stones, are built up a spiritual house." In the language of the Old Testament, the "hut" is a place for the worship of God. The House of Divine Service is the material projection of that which should be in the heart of man. Hence the following story, current in the pious Jewish sect of the *Chasidim*, taken from an unpublished collection in the possession of Rabbi Chajim Bloch:

"The House!"—Upon a time during the Feast of Weeks, which is Pentecost, there lay a great company of *Zadikim* and *Chassidim*** assembled under the roof of the Rabbi of Ruzhin.

*Orthodox Jews of especial piety.

**A fanatical Jewish sect who believe, among other things, in saints as intercessors, in magicians, in their own local Rabbi's power to perform miracles.

O blest the pious gaze which beheld those fruitful Vines and Tendrils encircling yonder table! Suddenly the Rabbi moved to this utterance: "After the exodus of the Jews out of Egypt, the *Sohma*, which is the sin of the serpent and the taint thereof began to fade out and disappear. The dense atmosphere, the dense curtain between the Jews and their Father in Heaven, parted into transparency in such sort, that, when the Law descended from the mountain on Sinai, the Jews had long been cleansed, and wholly, from any stain of that transgression. And God's radiance stood everywhere openly revealed, and God dwelt in the whole world, in the whole of mankind. Therefore, it is that we read in the litanies set apart for the Feast of Weeks: 'Lo, He bowed the heavens toward Sinai, and spirit and matter were joined.'....Then came the sin of the Calf. The which God could no way condone, seeing He had given over to men the virtue of Free Will. His radiance retreated, therefore, out of the human heart: 'And He caused His habitation to journey unto Silo, that He might dwell among men,' as is written in the Psalms. He withdrew Himself from within the spirit of human kind, and abode in a builded, *material* habitation. Therefore, these words of the prophet Ezekiel: 'Thou son of man! Say unto the people of Israel: "The House!" that they may be ashamed of their iniquities; and let them measure the pattern.* Only the sin of the Golden Calf brought about the need of building the Temple. Truly, had it not been for yonder sin, God would have set up His habitation in the hearts of men forever.'....Thus spoke the Rabbi, closing also thus: "On this, the day when the Law was first vouchsafed us in ancient times, an act of palpable sanctification will cleanse us, if we choose, from the stigma of the sin of the Golden Calf."

Directly related to this second source is a third, which I find in our obviously great psychic readiness to substitute the dwelling-place, and especially the house or the room, for the person living in the same,—a readiness which is apparent in a variety of idiomatic expressions, for instances. Thus there is in German an idiomatic and direct use of the word *Haus* (house) to designate a person, as in the phrase *altes Haus* (old boy), *lustiges Haus* (jolly fellow), etc. By the "House of Commons" and the "House of Lords" are meant those who

*That is, the ground-plan of the Temple.

assemble in the Houses of Parliament. The same usage may be observed in the word *forum*, *barreau*. The German word *Frauenzimmer* (literally "women's room"), originally a designation of the apartments occupied by women, is, by a synecdoche, used instead of "Woman." A similar instance is afforded by the word *seraya*, since *seraije* really means "lock." All sorts of phrases compare the human body with a house: "There's something wrong in his upper story"—"Nobody home"—"He has bats in his belfry"—"He was hit on the dome," etc. Dreams are well acquainted with this symbolism, as was pointed out, if in exaggerated fashion, by K. A. Scherner, when he maintained that dreams occasioned by bodily stimuli commonly employ a building symbolism to represent the body. Thus, in his *Leben des Traumes* [The Natural History of Dreams], Berlin, 1861, he says: "In general, the most common imaginative representation for the human body is a structure composed of walls, bricks, and beams—what is called a house, in short. In selecting this symbol for the body, it is clear that the phantasy effectively characterizes the organic structure of the body, which, like the house with its walls and bricks, possesses an architecture of its own, and a number of inner hollows and spaces; besides, the choice of this symbol apparently serves to give expression to the theory that the soul dwells in the body as in a house (and I almost feel like saying that this theory, if one concentrated on it, is capable of becoming an uncommonly vivid feeling); and finally, it may well be that our unmediated perception of the fact that all the external activity of man centres about the home and fireplace, just as all the inner activity of his soul takes place directly in and on the bodily structure and is fused therewith—it may well be that this perception, too, has contributed directly to the selection of the symbol. Since the body is an upright and upward striving structure, the phantasy selects as a symbol therefor a house with its several superimposed stories (indeed, the symbolism always conforms to the architectural styles familiar to the dreamer) . . . Yet, since the phantasy pays no heed to strict logical distinctions and definitions, it is frequently content to employ only a single element of the complete symbol; hence there appears often only the image of a room, or of a suite of rooms, or of an attic. . . ."

There remains to be emphasized merely the thought that the organization of an enduring ethical association intended to shut out the noisy marketplace of the trivial everyday life—an association which must inevitably be thought of as an asylum and a home for the better self—an undertaking such as this presents many analogies to the building of a house; and it must further be remembered that any striving that is accompanied by strong feelings and intense longing seldom fails, as soon as it speaks in images, to represent itself, too, in these

symbols with the help of a functional symbolism;* that is, to an objective representation of the philosophical ideas there will then be spontaneously conjoined a representation of the striving toward the glimpsed ideals. And yet here, too, the element of accident cannot be supposed to play a rôle, since the striving itself, i.e., the upbuilding of the self and the whole, belongs to the ideational content of the teaching.—Consider, too, the picture implied in the term “edify” (*aedificatio*).

We have seen, then, how firm and manifold are the ties between all that pertains to building and the ideas with which we are concerned. And I have still to name the last, perhaps the most profound bond: the inner kinship between these two symbol or image-groups which have thus found one another. The elementary signs of the philosophical schools of antiquity are thought-pictures reduced to their simplest forms: they are geometrical projections of the logical. Now, just as these pictures or diagrams are the basis of mathematics, so are they the basis of the rules and the tools of the art of building. The building must satisfy mathematical laws; and in its organization, from the foundations to the room, its every part—stone, column, pillar, beam—must express its function in the geometrical form it possesses. So that it may truly be said that in the building there is developed that play of forces which is both latent and expressed in the philosophical symbol. Viewed from this angle, the symbolism of building is a development, a fulfillment of the antecedent symbolism of sacred numbers. This symbolism will be the chief subject of interest in the following section of our study.

*As is pointed out repeatedly in my studies in the Freud-Bleuler *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*.

(To be continued)

(Translated by G. F. Schulz)

Incredulity and Bias in the Criticism of Psychoanalysis

By S. A. Tannenbaum, M. D.

New York

Not long ago Mr. M., whom I had not seen for several weeks, entered my office, looking very much perturbed. He tried to avoid my eyes but every now and then looked at me resentfully, almost angrily, and yet ashamed. Nervously he lit a cigarette, plumped down into the big arm-chair, crossed his legs and turned slightly away from me. All this time not a word. I sat and waited for him to unburden his soul. It was evident he was troubled. His obsession again, I thought—and waited. After puffing at his cigarette a few times, he disentangled his legs, planted them squarely before him, and began to speak.

"Well, here I am again! Those d—— obsessions about being a degenerate and crazy are back again. I was alright until—until— Do you know Dr. Peterson?"

"What Peterson?"

"Frederick Peterson—Professor Peterson!"

"Yes,—he was my instructor in neurology about twenty-five years ago."

"Is he an authority—on nervous diseases?"

"Yes, he is so esteemed. If I recollect aright he is or was until recently Professor of psychiatry at Columbia, was lecturer on insanity somewhere, at one time was president of the State Commission in Lunacy, wrote a book on "Mental Diseases" in 1889 and was one of the authors of the "American Text Book of Nervous and Mental Diseases," had something to do with the Craig Colony, wrote some books of essays and verse. But why don't you look him up in "Who's Who?" What's your interest in him? "

Mr. M., ignoring my questions, asked another:

"Do you know 'The Journal of the American Medical Association?'"

"Yes, fairly well; it is what its name says; it has a very large circulation throughout the country, I have been told."

"That's it! There's the trouble! My cousin, the druggist, you know who I mean—he always objected to my being analyzed—he predicted trouble for me—I went in to see him and he showed me an article by this Dr. Peterson in this Medical Journal in which the Doctor says that he has seen insanity and suicide result from psychanalysis! And that scared me so that all my obsessions are back."

"Are you sure of what you're saying? I can believe that of the Journal but I cannot believe it of Peterson,—he is a reasonable man and would not say anything so absurd!"

"Yes, he did! And it's the leading article in that Journal for December 6, 1919. My cousin showed it to me and I copied that sentence from it. Here it is!"

There was no mistaking the evidence—if he copied correctly. There was no mistaking the meaning of the words quoted. The only thing to do was to get a copy of the essay and see for myself. This was not a difficult thing to do.

Consideration of the possible injurious effects on neurotics of Dr. Peterson's criticism of psychanalysis, is my apology for dignifying anything so illogical and false with an answer. Not to take notice of the criticism by a man who is generally looked upon as an authority and who is fairly sure to be quoted or referred to by other opponents of psychanalysis—and critics are usually opponents—would, in my estimation, be doing a grave wrong to our patients, to physicians and to the world at large. To my regret I cannot deceive myself into thinking that my argument or consideration of Dr. P's points will or can in any way modify his opinions or his stand on the subject. A prejudice is like an obsession and is based on affective causes which cannot be dispelled by logic. One might as well "argue with the enchafed flood." But the reading public that takes its opinions from "authorities" may, unless it has already prejudged the case, be interested in seeing the weighty arguments, the serious reflections and the thoughtful consideration on the bases of which eminent psychologists (cf. the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, February, 1918), psychiatrists and neurologists, spurn at psychanalysis.

Fortunately, Dr. Peterson's comments on psychanalysis (l. c., p., 1740) are sufficiently brief to be reproduced here in their entirety, de-

parting from the original only in emphasizing the passages selected for analysis. He says:

PSYCHANALYSIS

"I shall close with a few words as to psychanalysis, on which subject I am qualified to speak, for I know Freud and Jung personally, have examined the method practically, and have or have had a number of practitioners of the cult as my friends. It has taken a considerable hold in America—though not so much in Europe—and owing to the fact that many reporters and writers are psychopaths and have undergone treatment by psychanalysis, these doctrines are now frequently encountered in editorials in newspapers, magazine articles and a few books by mediocrities. The theories of Freud and Jung are to psychology what cubism is to art, new, sensational and rather interesting. If they were not so pernicious in their application, as well as untrue in psychology, I should say nothing of them, but let them take their place in our historical medical museum along with all the other curiosities which the centuries have accumulated. In a few years they will be catalogued in that museum. I doubt if any persons have been benefited by this treatment. It requires months or years of work over each case, and it is very expensive. I have, on the other hand, seen very bad results from the psychanalysis of young women and men, permanent insanity, even suicide; and if it were not destined to be so short lived, I should advocate a law to prevent its employment in the treatment of young people.

There is only time to touch on one or two of the more salient features of the freudian theories. One of the most prominent is, for instance, that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish. This is a kind of harking back in a very crude way to the philosophical speculations on the world as will and presentation of such men as Berkeley, Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. If there is one clear fact in the psychology of our daily life it is that the essential function of the mind is its ability to deal with the future. It is anticipation of the future that guides our conduct, plans for us, chooses, distinguishes the right paths from the wrong paths that we are to follow, and the ways that are favorable to progress from those that are unfavorable. Our memories are our experience on which we base our life to be; the present is a point, the future is everything. This is true especially of youth, which is fullest of anticipation of the future, a long preparation for all that is in store. Hence our minds are always full of anticipation in our waking life—hopes, desires, wishes, plans, ambitions, aspirations, as

well as fears, timidity, anxiety, dread, suspense. Naturally, our dreams, which are a sort of ungoverned replica of waking thought, but with a wider horizon of memories, reflect in a moonlight kind of way the thinking processes of our day. These anticipations come to us in our dreams. Sometimes they are pleasant; sometimes, anxious and apprehensive. Now, Freud, observing that his children usually dreamed of pleasant things anticipated, the theater, toys, country trips, quite arbitrarily jumped to the conclusion that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish. Then he said all dreams were a fulfilment of a wish, and as the obsession grew in his mind, he decided it must always be a sexual wish, however disguised. When confronted with fear and anxiety dreams he had to invent words like distortion, disfigurement, displacement, etc., to twist around an easily explicable dream, easily explicable by study of the normal anticipations of the mind, to make such a dream in some extraordinary manner fulfil a wish. When a friend of his, after hearing him lecture on this subject, came to him triumphantly with a fear dream, wholly opposed to his theory, Freud suddenly exclaimed exultingly, "You had this dream just to confute my theory. That was the hidden wish." **The freudians will talk to you much about an elaborate symbolism which is wholly their invention. There are no symbols in anybody's dream life which were not first present in their conscious life. The freudian makes the claim that all the arts, and in fact all our civilization, had its origin in one drive, the sublimation of the sexual. The reader will remember that Rabelais had Pantagruel meet one Gaster in his travels who claimed that all the arts, powers, accomplishments of our civilization were the sublimation of the desire of the stomach. One theory is as good as the other. They are both rabelaisian. If one reads the analyses made by the psychanalysts, one will find a complete revelation there of the type of mind of the analyst himself, his intelligence, his logic, his symbolism, his character; indeed, one will learn much more of him in this way than one will of the unfortunate patient the analyst thinks he is studying."**

The reader will note that Dr. Peterson assumes to be qualified to speak on psychanalysis because (1) he knows Freud and Jung personally; (2) has examined the method practically and (3) has had a number of practitioners of this cult as his friends. Numbers 1 and 3 are no qualifications. The fact that I know a certain composer and a number of musicians who play the composer's music does not qualify me to express an opinion or criticism of the music. Knowing a poet personally does not qualify me to express a worth while criticism

of his poetry. Many men must have known Darwin and some of Darwin's disciples and yet have known nothing or next to nothing of biology. This is so obvious that one wonders why Dr. Peterson thought it necessary to mention the fact that he knows Freud and Jung and some of their disciples. One suspects something of a personal nature behind his remark,—and the suspicion is confirmed by the bias which pervades his criticism.

Ground No. 2 may be of immense significance, or it may be as meaningless as 1 and 3. What does "I have examined the method practically" mean? Has Dr. Peterson attempted to psychoanalyse patients and failed? If so it becomes a question of his competence and we are justified in demanding a bill of particulars. We therefore want to know all about his technique and where he learned his technique and what his natural aptitude for this kind of work is. We also want to know what kind of cases he tried to cure, how much time he gave them, how hard or easy he made it for them and how much sympathy he brought to his task. Or does Dr. P's ambiguous sentence conceal the possibility that he did not analyse his patients himself but sent them to a psychoanalyst? If so we want to know the same data about his deputy. Dr. P's qualification to express a critical judgment of psychoanalysis is yet to be proved.

We are informed that "many reporters and writers are psychopaths" and that this helps to account for the frequent occurrence of editorials and essays on psychoanalysis in the newspapers and magazines. Even if this statement be accepted as true, as in part it is, we see no reason for its introduction into Dr. P's essay unless it be that he wishes to give the members of the medical profession the impression that the writings on the subject are from the pens of psychopaths. But this is surely as irrelevant an argument as to the truth of the Freudian doctrines as it would be to say, with equal truth, that many neurologists and psychiatrists are psychopaths and that therefore their writings against psychoanalysis have no logical validity or that therefore their writings on neurology are false, or, finally, that therefore so many articles against psychoanalysis are being written.

We detect a quantum of personal venom in the remark about "a few books by mediocrities." But how about the books by non-mediocrities? Are Putman, Jelliffe, Kempf and White mediocrities? Is G. Stanley Hall a mediocrity? In what respect are the writers of such books mediocrities? Whose approval must writers on psychoanalysis have to be removed from the scrap heap of "mediocrities?" The only thing

that matters is whether what they say is true and whether they say it well. Snobbishness has no place in medicine. Text-books and lay expositions are usually written by "mediocrities." Compilation is easier than scientific investigation. And popular treatises on scientific subjects by persons skilled in such writing is wholly compatible with a logical social order and with truth.

The theories of Freud are "new" and "sensational," we are told. But that does not necessarily make them false. As a matter of fact we have been told over and over by numerous critics that Freud had been anticipated in many points and that much of what he teaches has been long current as universal knowledge which has been ignored by the psychologists. That they are "sensational" may be true; but that does not make them false. The sensational thing about these doctrines is the fact that their significance had been overlooked by the psychologists and neurologists for so long. And is not everything new in a sense sensational?

If Dr. P. will prove his assertions that the Freudian doctrines are "pernicious in application" and "untrue in psychology" he will have rendered humanity and at least two sciences an inestimable service. His mere assertions are of no value. Honest, sincere, competent physicians and psychologists have found the contrary to be true. No psychologist has been able to invalidate on psychological principles a single one of Freud's tenets.

Dr. P. pronounces the relationship of psychanalysis to psychology to be "what cubism is to art." Inasmuch as I do not pretend to omniscience and do not know much about cubism, I am helpless as to how to meet this objection. It is clear that Dr. Peterson condemns cubism, that to him cubism is not art. But Dr. Peterson may be all wrong as to this. If his mental faculties operate in the same way when he thinks of art as when he thinks of psychanalysis, I am sure he is all wrong. Besides, a new science, or what is impressing a large part of the world as a new science, cannot be dismissed by an analogy or by calling it names. No, Dr. Peterson, we want grounds more relative than this!

In the same paragraph in which many writers on psa. are said to be psychopaths, the medical profession is informed that psa. "has taken a considerable hold in America—though not so much in Europe." Now, what in the world does this mean? Why is this statement made? Does it not clearly imply, and was it not intended to imply, that in ignorant, half-baked, semi-barbarous "America" anything goes,

but that in Europe—cultured, civilized Europe—Doctors are too well informed to be taken in by the psychoanalysts? Another convincing argument! The mere fact that American physicians and *littérateurs* have become interested in and devoted to *psa.* is assumed to be sufficient evidence that *psa.* is pernicious and untrue. Surely Dr. Peterson did not make that statistical sounding assertion without a motive. And where are the statistical proofs of his assertion? Only in his biased mind's eye.

And, besides, does not Dr. Peterson know that young America is at last becoming independent of the compulsion to pattern itself on European models and no longer waits for Europe's approval? "Made in Europe" is no longer a guarantee of soundness, not even in matters of science.

Furthermore, the statement that *psa.* has not taken a considerable hold in Europe is not true. If the amount of psychoanalytic literature being published in Austria, Germany, England, Switzerland, Hungary, Holland, France and Russia, the increasing number of physicians practicing *psa.* in these countries, and the number of *littérateurs*, sexologists, criminologists, historians, and other intellectuals abroad interested in the subject, are criteria, then Europe has caught the contagion much worse than we in this country.

Very graciously Dr. Peterson is willing to assign to the psychoanalytic theories a "place in our historical medical museum along with all the other curiosities which the centuries have accumulated. In a few years they will be catalogued in that museum." The gift of prophecy may be an endowment of neurologists and psychiatrists of the Peterson school. I am not a prophet, being only a physician and psychoanalyst, but as I look back upon the history of science I think it not impossible that the attacks on *psa.* will go down in the wallet of time alongside the virulent attacks on the great pathfinders of the past. Time will tell! But Dr. Peterson's prediction must not prejudice anyone against these new teachings. That sort of thing is too cheap and too unworthy of a man with scientific pretensions. Many things are predicted that do not happen.

"I doubt," says Dr. Peterson, "if any persons have been benefited by this treatment." Here we have something definite in the way of criticism. But Drs. Jung and Freud, and other "practitioners of the cult" whom Dr. Peterson knows personally, say that they have cured patients suffering from psychoneuroses, from very grave psychoneur-

oses, from psychoneuroses that have resisted all other methods. What then does Dr. Peterson's statement mean? Does it not imply that the words of Drs. Jung and Freud, whom Dr. Peterson knows personally, and all other analysts who claim to have cured psychoneurotics cannot be trusted? We are then confronted with a pure question of fact. Have or have not our analyzed patients been cured or benefited? Speaking for myself, I here challenge Dr. Peterson to disprove my statement that I have cured some cases of psychoneurosis, greatly benefited many others and harmed none. To prove my sincerity in this matter I am willing to let committees appointed by the New York Academy of Medicine and by the Medical Society of the County of New York interview my patients and ex-patients. And I am quite sure that Freud, Stekel, Jones, Ferenczi, Marciniowski, Maeder, Baudouin, Pfister, Kaplan, Hart, White, Kempf, and many others, will do likewise.

But even on purely theoretical considerations, Dr. Peterson cannot possibly maintain his point. He knows, he must know, that almost any method of treatment cures some neurotics. Chiropractors cure some, Christian Science cures some, Osteopathy cures some, the touching of relics cures some, and even old-fashioned neurologists cure some. Then why should not psa. accomplish a cure now and then? As a matter of fact other detractors or defamers of psa.—call them what you will—have not only admitted that psa. cures but have insisted that the cures are due to suggestion. Does Dr. Peterson know of something in psa. which makes it impossible for it to cure neurotics? If, so, he ought to enlighten the medical world on the subject. Why does he keep the secret to himself?

And furthermore, even if psa. did not cure any patients, that would not disprove the truth of a very important portion of Freud's psychology. His psychology may be true though it may not cure nervous persons; much or perhaps all of the standard text-book psychology is true though it does not cure any one of anything—except possibly of a desire to know psychology. And on the other hand, a therapeutic system may cure, e.g., Christian Science, though there is no truth in the theory behind it. Psa. does not stand or fall with the therapeutic test.

"It requires months or years of work over each case, and is very expensive." Very true; but this is no objection to the Freudian theories. Desperate diseases require desperate remedies. Mild cases, cases of short duration, are cured in a few days or in a few weeks. Cases that have lasted many years, have defied the therapeutic efforts of neurologists the world over, have been discouraged and disheartened

by bungling psychiatrists and nerve specialists, require long periods of treatment and these are, necessarily, expensive. But, if the whole truth must be told, the neurologists worry more about the psychanalysts' fees than the patients. Why this is so, we need not discuss now. The patients realize that at last they are getting something for their money instead of nasty mixtures and idiotic advice to "use their will power" or to "pull themselves together" or to "forget it" and are willing to pay. If statistical evidence were available it would show, I am sure, that psychanalysts have been much more considerate of their patients' financial condition than the orthodox neurologists. The intimate relationship that grows up between analyst and patient makes this inevitable.

Judging from the stylistic and linguistic peculiarities of Dr. Peterson's essay, I cannot but think that he has no fine sense of the meaning of English words. Otherwise I should ask him what the word "It" means in his sentence: "It requires months or years of work over each case." Does not this imply that in time some persons may be benefited by psychoanalytic treatment? Yet he says he doubts if any persons have been so benefited. If the method can in time do good, why should it not be resorted to in cases that have resisted other methods of treatment?

And how about the writers of editorials and magazine articles, many of whom (according to Dr. Peterson) are "psychopaths?" Is it thinkable that they would write all those editorials and articles and make the subject so popular if they had not been benefited by psychoanalytic treatment?

And now we come to what is unquestionably the most wicked item in Dr. Peterson's article. He says: "I have seen very bad results from the psychoanalysis of young women and men, permanent insanity, even suicide." Error and unreason can go no further than in the sentence we have just quoted.

To one who knows the true nature of the psychoneuroses as revealed by psychoanalytic studies, the objection that the treatment requires months, and in certain exceptional cases years, is not an objection but a decided recommendation. A psychoneurosis always means an individual in conflict with society, in conflict with himself. The neurotic is one who has not found his place, has not learned adequately to sublimate his natural impulses, has been thwarted in the expression of himself, has been stamped as unfit or "peculiar" when he rebelled

against hypocritical social, political, economic, moral and religious systems which he feels are not in conformity with human nature and not calculated to bring out the best that is in mankind, and has despairingly fled from this unsocial world into neurosis. Such a person cannot be readjusted to such a world in the twinkling of an eye. Re-education is an absolutely essential element in every psychotherapeutic system, and re-education takes time. When one considers the neurotic's secret pride in his illness, the benefits he derives from his neurosis, his hostility to his family and to his environment, his helplessness in sublimating in the manner he would wish, his stubbornness, and his other unconscious motives, one may realize what a difficult—and consequently, time-consuming—and, therefore, expensive task it is to take such a person and transplant him from a world of happy fantasies into a cold and sordid world of realities against which the hyper-sensitive neurotic rebels with every fibre of his being.

Before dismissing this phase of our argument, we venture to inquire whether Dr. Peterson has a quick and inexpensive method of curing persons afflicted with distressing and long-lasting phobias, obsessions, apprehensions, tics, spasms, and other forms of hysteria? Does he or anyone else think that nervous persons and their suffering families would submit to long and expensive methods of treatment if short and inexpensive ones were to be had?

Besides, is there any reason why psychanalysis should be expected to yield one hundred per cent. of cures? Not even the best surgeons get anything like that from their work. Is it not enough that psychanalysis cures—no question about that—cases that have resisted all other methods of treatment, cases that have been given up in despair and disgust by the neurologists and psychiatrists?

Is surgery condemned because occasional cases of incurable cancer, diabetic gangrene, pyemia, etc., commit suicide? Is neurology calumniated and neurologists abused because they do not cure all their cases or because some of their patients—cases of cerebral or spinal syphilis, dementia precox, phobias, compulsions, etc.,—commit suicide. Is internal medicine lampooned and the internist ridiculed because sufferers from chronic tuberculosis, chronic nephritis, etc., occasionally terminate their unhappy lives by their own hands?

What Dr. Peterson says about 'having seen permanent insanity and even suicide' result from psychanalysis is very important—if true. If true, he is wholly justified in his condemnation of psychanalysis

and could very properly advocate the enactment of a law "to prevent its employment in the treatment of young people." In fact, even in adults and in old people, I would add. But his statement is not true. I hereby challenge Dr. Peterson to furnish proof that he has 'seen permanent insanity, even suicide' from the *psa.* of young women and men. Let him submit his evidence before a committee appointed by the Academy of Medicine or the County Medical Society. If he is sincere in his strictures, if his purpose is honest, if he has the interest of humanity at heart, he will do so.

In the first place, it is absolutely impossible to prove logically that suicide or insanity was ever the result of a method of treatment. In the second place, it is absolutely impossible for a person to "have seen" suicide or insanity result from a method of treatment.

The causes of insanity are very obscure, as any text-book will show. What conditions are essential causes and which are only predisposing factors cannot yet be stated with positiveness, as any standard text-book will show. And no one can as yet even venture to suggest what straw of fact or circumstance will serve to break the camel's back, to push a person over the brink of sanity into the vortex of insanity.

It is true,—alas! too true,—that symptoms in the early stages of dementia precox, manic depressive insanity, melancholia and dementia paralytica, very often resemble those seen in the psychoneuroses and that a differential diagnosis is often very difficult and at times next to impossible, at least until the patient has been under observation for a considerable time. Our insane asylums undoubtedly contain many inmates supposedly insane who are only neurotics (condemned to a living death only because no one takes an interest in these economic failures), just as there are many supposedly sane or only "peculiar" people about town who ought properly to be in insane asylums. We mention these facts to point out that a supposedly neurotic individual might prove to be a lunatic after he had begun psychoanalytic treatment and that an illogical or ignorant thinker might jump to the conclusion that the treatment resulted in insanity. Some minds never grow beyond the "post hoc, propter hoc" stage. There is absolutely no question, in the light of very interesting and significant experiences here and abroad during the past ten or fifteen years, that it would be much sounder to say of such a case that it went on to the frank development of insanity notwithstanding psychoanalytic treatment.

Insanity, we are told almost daily, is greatly on the increase in America as well as in Europe. But if psa. has anything to do with the increase of psychoses this ought not to happen in Europe where, according to Dr. Peterson, psa. has not taken such hold as in America. But surely no one believes in this. The increase of insanity is due to much more serious causes than any method of treating neurotics. In fact, insanity has been on the increase, even in America, before Freudism became a subject for parlor conversation and the attacks of professors and "neurologists."

And surely insanity has occurred in the practice even of neurologists who knew and know nothing of psychanalysis. Would Dr. Peterson in those cases too have attributed the psychosis to the method of treatment employed? If not, why the discrimination?

It has happened to me several times that physicians and non-medical psychanalysts have referred patients to me for psa. whom I found to be suffering from incurable psychoses. And only two years ago I had the reverse experience: a man who had been "diagnosed" as suffering from hopeless dementia precox was brought to me after he had been in two "sanitaria" and whom I found to be suffering only from intense depression resulting from business reverses and the bungling of his physician. This man was completely cured in several months and is perfectly well to this day. Other psychanalysts have undoubtedly had similar experiences.

That psa. is capable of harm admits no question. Persons ignorant of medicine and otherwise lacking the temperamental and educational qualifications requisite in the performance of so delicate a task as re-adjusting a human being to society and making peace between his ideals and his self, ought not to be permitted to meddle with the sick. The heavy hand of ignorance can no doubt lacerate and crush so delicate a flower as a sick soul. But therefore to reject psa. would be as mad as to condemn surgery or neurology because there are incompetent surgeons and neurologists.

Has psychanalysis ever caused a patient to commit suicide? Any person trained to logical thinking must know that this question cannot possibly be answered either way. All that one can say is that nervous persons have been known to commit suicide. But what the deciding factor was in any particular case cannot possibly be ascertained, not even in the case of an imaginary ante-suicidal confession. I have never heard of a person who had attempted suicide blaming psa.

for his rash resolution. There is nothing in *psa.* ever to have such an effect on any patient. On the contrary, the patients are buoyed up, stimulated, encouraged to live, to make a fight for position and prestige, to overcome the obstacles in their paths, to dare and do, to be reconciled with the world, to be tolerant of their environment's shortcomings, to know and to forgive, and to love. In all this there is only life and happiness, not despair and suicide. *Psychoanalysis* means to most patients a spiritual re-birth, a re-birth into a world of possible beauty and goodness in which everyone should do his share.

Neurotics have been known to attempt or commit suicide. There is probably not a single text-book on neurology that does not caution the neurologist to anticipate suicidal attempts on the part of his patients and to try to guard against them. And surely Dr. Peterson knows that this was so even before the days of *psa.* And there certainly is nothing to warrant anyone in maintaining such a mad proposition as that increases in suicides, if there is any increase, keeps pace with the growing interest in *psa.* We may refer to Loewenfeld's splendid work on compulsions (*"Zwangszustände,"* 1904, Wiesbaden, p. 417) as showing that suicide occurs in unanalysed neurotics. That suicidal ideas and attempts are frequent in all mental maladies, even those not susceptible to *psa.*, as an escape from mental pain is convincingly shown in Drs. Fursac and Rosanoff's *"Manual of Psychiatry,"* on pp. 167, 332, 350, et passim.

To one who has a real knowledge of nervous persons, of the true meaning of neurosis, of their unconscious emotions and their unconscious sense of guilt, of their overwhelming feeling of inferiority, of their ruthless self-condemnation, their exaggerated piety and adherence to the law of retributive justice, the persistency and frequency with which they "accidentally"—and often with conscious intention—mutilate themselves, fall out of the windows of hotels and office buildings, topple down mountain gorges, take the wrong medicine, forget to turn off the gas, fail to see approaching trains or automobiles, set fire to themselves, fall into the clutches of surgeons, etc., there is nothing remarkable in the occurrence of an occasional suicide. Abortive attempts at suicide, with or without self-mutilation or injury, is and has been a frequent occurrence in neurotics,—and *psa.* has nothing to do with it. And one who has won the confidence of psychasthenics knows that thoughts of suicide, mutilation, injury of others, occupy the minds of these invalids much more than is indicated by the actual occurrence of these offences. It is safe to say that the sympathetic

attitude of the analyst and his encouragement have greatly diminished the frequency of such transgressions. With the appreciation of their vindictiveness, their hostility to kindred and society, their sado-masochistic impulse, the infantile character of their behavior, etc., and the certainty of forfeiting the esteem of the analyst—their sole and last hope as a bridge between themselves and society—they take a more healthy attitude toward their problems and their environment and give up their suicidal and homicidal tendencies. But an even greater deterrent is their gradually acquired conviction that they are not insane or degenerate, that they are not incurable, that their perverse tendencies are not congenital, that their sexual anesthesia or impotence is only temporary, that they will cease to be dependent on detested and unsympathetic relatives.

Notwithstanding all this, it is true that even patients undergoing psychoanalytic treatment may now and then commit or attempt suicide or some other crime (larceny, arson, mayhem, etc.). Impatient with the slow progress of their treatment, disheartened by the lack of sympathetic understanding at home, resentful of their dependency for support on those who do not love them, humiliated by the contempt of their acquaintances, discouraged by the stupid sneers of the "family physician," their faith in psychoanalysis and the analyst shaken by the wicked and much advertised gibes of the jealous and resentful neurologists, they wreak vengeance on all who have contributed to their misery—the doctor, the family, their special wronger, their "friends," medical science and, above all, themselves—by taking their lives or pretending to do so. Fortunately, most such attempts are no more than attempts and are merely a way to getting some measure of sympathy or attention or to attaining some more worthy though obscure purpose.

Most of the rest of what Dr. Peterson has to say is an attempt at an exposition of his own theory of the nature of dreams and a kind of serio-comic account of the history of Freud's dream theory. That I consider Dr. Peterson's theory a wholly inadequate explanation of a phenomenon that has puzzled all mankind until Freud found the solution, goes without saying. If the matter had been as simple as Dr. Peterson makes it, we would not be discussing it now any more than we discuss the multiplication table.

One would have to search anti-psychoanalytic literature very carefully indeed to find anything more contradictory and more absurd

than Dr. Peterson's statements about symbolism. "The freudians will talk to you much about an elaborate symbolism which is wholly their invention. There are no symbols in anybody's dream life which were not first present in their [sic] conscious life." Standing alone, the second of these sentences is perfectly true; but as a pendant to the sentence preceding it, it is absurd. That symbolism is not a Freudian invention and that Freud's theories are, as a whole, true it is the purpose of the editors of "Psyche and Eros" and its collaborators to help establish to the world.

"The Freudian makes the claim that all the arts, and in fact all our civilization, had its [sic] origin in one drive, the sublimation of the sexual." This statement, so utterly false, is so unworthy of any person posing as a serious student of a subject as important as the psychoanalytic theories, that we are willing to attribute it to cerebral fatigue.

In appraising our critic's onslaught on our theories and our practice we must not omit to take into consideration his reliability as a historian of the psychoanalytic theory. One need not have more psychoanalytic skill than the average unanalyzed individual is endowed with by the universal mother of mankind to see the full significance of a wanton distortion of easily ascertainable facts. Speaking of Freud's theory of fear-dreams, Dr. Peterson says: "When a friend of his, after hearing him lecture on this subject, came to him triumphantly with a fear dream, wholly opposed to his theory, Freud suddenly exclaimed exultantly, 'You had this dream just to confute my theory; that was the hidden wish.'" Whether this is an honest—I say nothing of scientific—account of the matter I leave to the reader's judgment after he has compared it with the following abstract from Freud's *Traumdeutung* (ed. 3, 1911, p. 111): "Without an analysis and merely by means of a conjecture, I permitted myself to interpret a little occurrence in the case of a friend who had been my colleague in eight classes at the Gymnasium. At a lecture that I had delivered before a small assemblage he heard the novel theory that a dream is a wish fulfillment; he went home and dreamt that 'he had lost all his cases'—he was a lawyer—and complained to me about it. I took refuge in the evasion: 'one can't win all one's cases,' but to myself I thought: 'if for eight years I sat as the head of my class on the first bench while he was somewhere in the middle of the class, may he not naturally have harbored from his boyhood days the wish that I too might for once make a bad blunder?'"

We see, then, that in the single sentence we have quoted from what pretends to be a calm, unimpassioned, sober, deliberate consideration

of the work of a great thinker, a work in every way as great and as important as Darwin's "Origin of Species," there are the following mis-statements of fact: the lecture was not on fear-dreams; the friend did not come to Freud triumphantly; it was not a fear-dream; it was not "wholly opposed to his theory" (only in its manifest content was the dream the contrary of a wish); Freud did not exclaim "suddenly" nor "exultantly," for he had experienced that phenomenon often enough to understand it fully; Freud's explanation of the dream was nothing like what Dr. Peterson says it was; the hidden wish was that Freud might bring disgrace upon himself by what the (jealous) dreamer considered an absurd theory.

Towards the beginning of his paper, Dr. Peterson makes a statement that is so characteristic of his loose thinking, that we must quote it, though it is not quite relevant: "The more one knows of a subject, the more critical, even skeptical, one becomes. If one knows nothing of a subject, the soil is prepared for faith, preconception, conviction." Would heart of man once think it! Ignorance leads to conviction and knowledge begets scepticism! If so, we had better close our schools and bury our books fathoms deep. But we need not do this. Everyone but a neurologist knows that knowledge leads to conviction and ignorance to questioning. Like most "critics" of psychanalysis, Dr. Peterson winds up his commentary with a gibe at the personality of the analyst. He says: "If one reads the analyses made by the psychanalysts, one will find a complete revelation there of the type of mind of the analyst himself, his intelligence, his logic, his symbolism, his character."

It is needless to say that attacking the character of the analyst is not a legitimate argument against psychanalysis. One wonders why the critics of psychanalysis are so fond of indulging in such personalities, seeing that the retort courteous is so easy. The time has come when psychanalysis is greater than Freud and greater than the analyst. It now belongs to the world and has become a world force. No phase of man's mental life but it receives some light from the psychanalytic theories. We are much nearer to an understanding of the vast problems associated with the growth of our culture and our institutions than we have ever been before Freud—and yet some critics must condescend to these petty personalities.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Theogony of "El"

(A BIBLICAL INSTANCE OF PURPOSEIVE CONDENSATION)

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"Can you suggest any device by which we can make them believe this fiction? None at all by which we could persuade the men with whom we begin—but their sons and the next generation, and all generations following, might be taught to believe it."
Plato, *Republic*, III, 415.

The first three words of the opening chapter of *Genesis* have given rise to one of the most debated problems in Biblical lore. The words "Bereshith baru Elohim" present an apparently insurmountable linguistic difficulty. They are translated: "In the beginning God created."

The problem confronting the student of the original text consists in the apposition of a verb—"baru"—in the singular, with the name of the deity—"Elohim"—in the plural.

Numerous attempts have been made to explain away this curious and interesting incongruity. Scholars of different periods have exercised their ingenuity to solve this riddle. But from the "pluralis majestatis" theory of Petrus Lombardus to the more recent "pluralis trinitatis" theory of Rudolf Stier all the hypotheses offered have been *ex post facto* and extremely conjectural. Among scholars the matter has hitherto remained a Gordian Knot.

The occurrence of a disagreement between the verb and the noun designating Divinity is not unusual in the holy writings of the various religious systems. In every instance where this happens the verb assumes the plural form, as befits the majesty of Divinity. The book of *Genesis* illustrates the occurrence typically in the phrase of Elohim: "Let us make a man in our image." The opposite error in grammar is not encountered in the Assyrian Babylonian

mythology, nor in the mythology of the Hindus, or that of Greece, or of Rome, although their highest Gods are endowed with a large number of epithets, and a conventional plural form would not be altogether out of place. It is a fact, fairly well known now even among others than extensive students of comparative religion, that an important Divinity often assumed in adjectival form the designation of the minor divinities it replaced when it absorbed them into its own cult and ritual. Among the priests and upholders of the various Divinities there existed the same jealousy and rivalry leading to competitive under-cutting of each other's territory that existed in latter day commercial America between the local oil companies, for instance, before they become one vast highly centralized business organization. And just as in absorbing its rivals a business organization often finds it expedient to leave the flavor of a local name intact and even to continue for a time the local management, so the successful priesthood of a Divinity which was rapidly growing in favor often took over name, ritual and worship of some local minor Divinity, simply annexing the whole to its holy armamentarium.

We have here on a large scale the process of condensation, the mechanism whose rôle in the emotional sphere of individual life Freud has described in masterly fashion. Inasmuch as the affect (the religious emotion) of a people got linked up to a certain Divinity as represented by a given name, it was often easier to secure their allegiance to a more actively exploited Divinity by the simple process of annexing that name in adjectival form to the larger Divinity. Hence we find the worship of numerous local Divinities in different states of fusion, and in many instances we may actually trace the process of consolidation down to its final product—a more or less generalized, more or less unified worship-ritual, governed by a powerful priesthood. Mass conversions represent this process in our own midst.

Bearing in mind, then, the numerous conditions that make for condensation, may not "Elohim" prove to be a condensation?

The Semitic languages are rich in compounds. The Pentateuch, it will be recalled, was written in a chirography that lacked punctuation marks, phrasing, vowels. The reading of the Holy Books, an affair which was in the hands of the rabbis at first, remained traditional, until the 12th century when the massoretic fathers, so-called, supplied chirographic deficiencies.

Would it be surprising if under the circumstances "El-ha-iom" became condensed into one word?

Whether the written symbol was one word or more than one originally, the written form would be the same. No space separated words from each other in the old writings. No sign indicated where one word or phrase ended

and the next began. Because of this the proper value and meaning of the text depended upon traditional reading, and the reading and interpretation was originally an affair of the rabbinical school.

"El-ha-iam" is a rendering which does not do violence to the text. It involves no changes in the text. The meaning, "El-of-the-water," is very illuminating. It places us face to face with a glimpse at a Biblical theogony which must have been otherwise suppressed by the priestly class. The Jewish cosmogony seemed to lack something that all other holy cosmogonies carefully preserved, namely, an account of the creation or origin of God himself. It is more than likely that in its original form the Biblical story was complete in that respect. We have before us some proof: "El-of-the-water."

"El," then, was a water-god. Here we have an exact correspondence with the origin of all other great Divinities. All ancient theogonies begin their account with water. A Divinity identified only by locality (geographic origin) has not completely lost his partial character; to acquire the character of a universal Divinity he must be traced to a cosmic source.

Water is the universal, ab-original substance out of which all else, including the creator, is traced in all ancient accounts of the origins of things. "El-ha-iam," according to *Genesis*, creates the beasts and the birds out of water. The birth phantasy, the significance of which was so clearly pointed out by Freud, repeats itself over and over with significant reiteration. "Iam," we have already intimated, signifies "water." Specifically it is the Hebrew for "Sea." It is interesting to note that "Maia" (Sansk. "water") is also the mother of Brahma.

Thus El and Brahma are undoubtedly parallel folk-constructions, symbolized representations of birth fancies.

The reading, "El-ha-iam baru" presents no grammatical incongruity; it does away with the linguistic stumbling block which has baffled the ingenuity of Semitic and Biblical scholars. Incidentally it identifies "El" as a Divinity and shows him to be no exception in the category of ancient theogonies.

We need not look far for the significance of "El." What this Divinity symbolizes on the cosmic plane is sufficiently clear from the form of the noun: "El" is the Babylonian "Elos," Phoenician "Ila," Sanskr. "il," Arab. "Ilah" or "Allah," Greek "elios," Latin "Sol." Like them, he is a terrestrial God with the attributes of all terrestrial gods: a friend, a teacher, a savior of mankind; like the others, becoming a judge on high, a celestial Divinity.

The origin of "El" farther identifies him with the other chief theogonic fancies. It is significant from the psychanalytic viewpoint that "iam" and its correlates "ioin," "yoni," "jonas," "oannes," "okeanos," (all probably traceable to the Sanskr. root "ya") all mean "water," and that "iam" in one shape or

another is the mother and the first nurse of all creators as well as of all living creatures. Thus, the most universal birth phantasy, as embodied in the most ancient and widespread religious myths, is rooted in fact.

"Iam," it will be observed, is the literal inversion of "Mai," Sanskr. "Maia," Assyri. "Mei."

In "Mar-iam" we have the two-fold process of reduplication and inversion; the reduplication may have the same significance as the dream within the dream, and the inversion of the letters of a name is undoubtedly a form of displacement, an attempt to conceal.

"Mar-iam" is the sister of Moses. "Myrrha" or "Maia" is the mother of Bacchus, another savior of mankind. Christ has his "maia" (= Maria), mother Mary, a form of the same noun. The mother of Krishna, of Buddha, of Hermes, of Adonis is called "Myrrha" or "Maia."

Invariably every world savior has or acquires his "maia" by the time the myths about him are sufficiently rounded out. Even the mother of Samona Cadova, the Siamese savior, is called "Maia."

It is sufficiently clear that "iam," "mei," "maia," "mara," "maria," meaning "water," stands for the female reproductive principle in nature. It generates the male who in turn becomes creator and savior. Hence saviors are invariably represented as first-born and almost always as virgin-born.

The Gods, which had been arrived at through the folk mind's pre-occupation with the problem of origins and birth, are symbolically identified with the various elemental forces of nature. This displacement from the concrete and particular to the elemental-universal opens up endless paths for the operation of folk fantasy and results in numerous myth accretions all of which, however, start from the same small nucleus of observed facts.

Varia

VISUALIZED LOCUTIONS.....By J. Marcinowski, M. D.

All dreams as well as symbolic actions—and what actions are not, in final analysis, symbolic actions?—are the expression of something and are frequently easy enough to interpret as soon as one succeeds in thinking of them as pictorial dramatizations of certain idioms and locutions. It is important for the analyst to bear this in mind, for these modes of expression can only with very great difficulty be interpreted by the classical method of free associations. We shall illustrate this by a few examples. Let us begin with a **dream**:

She was visiting her parental home. As she entered the house it seemed very different from what her parents' home really was. Even the rooms were different. The furniture and other furnishings looked strange, and the woman too who came to meet her was a strange woman whom she had never seen. And yet she knew it was her mother. This dream is to be understood as a figure of speech, as if everything—the house, the furniture, and her mother—were strange to her. The dream images are a dramatic representation of the location: "her parental home had become strange to her"; to all intents and purposes "her mother was a stranger to her." As she was departing from the house (in the dream) something very peculiar was happening on the outer staircase: wherever she set her foot little tongues of flame shot up from the carpet, so that she had to hurry downstairs. "The ground burned under her feet."

Let us look at another example! The night before, as she and some companions were out driving, their horses grew restive. One of the horses got entangled in the traces. Inasmuch as the carriage was going down a steep hill at the time and there was a sharp curve ahead of them, the party, in considerable excitement, got out and walked the rest of the way. Later in the evening this little incident very naturally furnished material for lively conversation. The night following this a young woman dreamed that she was standing upright in a wagon which was being drawn by wild horses that were out of her control and were running away; the reins were trailing on the ground; the road led down into a dangerous precipice.

This dream was called to my attention with the object of showing me that here was a dream in which there was really no meaning, for it was quite obvious that it was nothing but an echo of the little incident that had transpired the previous day. Of course, the latent content of the dream was very different. The dream only took advantage of the outer material to give expression at this opportune time to deeply hidden desires, and it expressed these in a picture containing an abundance of locutions. We are all accustomed to thinking of "wild horses" as an embodiment of "wild passions." With this key we translate the dream as follows:

"Would that my wild untrammelled passions ran away with me! I too want to break loose, even at the risk of a precipitous fall. I know that in wishing this I am traveling a downward path." ("Muddy roads" often occur in such dreams.)

And now let us cite a hysterical action:—A lady was involved in an improper relationship with an elderly gentleman who was also her teacher. His portrait was conspicuously located in her room. Every night, before going to bed, she had to wipe this portrait carefully and brush away every particle of dust, as if in response to some internal compulsion. Unless she did this, she could not fall asleep. Not infrequently it happened she was so tired that she fell asleep sitting in a chair in front of it. The interpretation of this compulsive act resolves itself into definite locutions which read as follows: "I must not go to my rest until I have removed every trace of dirt that might fall on his image. I must keep his memory pure (in a dual sense!—a portrait is in reality a memorial). Not a particle of dirt must attach to his image." As a matter of fact, her parents had long suspected a relationship between her and this man. They had often questioned her on the subject and had succeeded in raising doubts in her mind as to her judgment of him. Her dual attitude toward him is imaged in her compulsive determination to keep his image, i. e., her conception of his character, clear from all uncleanness. For her doubts concerning him, and also for her forbidden pleasure, she punished herself by not being able to find rest until, etc.

To conclude.—A young man was going home through the woods after a psychanalytic session with me. Suddenly he got a feeling as if a large dark object, like a body, were lying in the path before him and he stumbled so that he was almost thrown headlong to the ground. Recovering his balance, he turned around and saw—nothing. But the idea persisted. When I questioned him about it, he said he had a feeling that it was the body of a human being that lay there, its back upward and the face invisible.—Was it a man or a woman? —It was a man, an elderly man. It turns out to have been his own father. Recalling what we had been discussing during the session preceding his hallucination—it might be termed that—it was easy to deduce that he wished to "pass over" his father [a German idiom meaning "to get away from his father's authority"]. Passing over him would mean the road to freedom; but this was possible only "over his dead body." And this was in reality my patient's main conflict.

[S. A. T.]

REVIEWS

BJERRE, DR. POUL: THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHANALYSIS.

Translated by Elizabeth N. Barrow. Boston: R. G. Badger, 1920; 8 vo., pp. 439.

Whether one has a right to propogate erroneous beliefs may be questioned; it has been questioned since time out of mind; but I am ready to agree that Dr. Bjerre should have the right to publish and republish his views as often and as far and wide as he may see fit. But, seeing that the publishers charge four dollars for the Revised Edition of his book, he should have given it a less misleading title, so that we might not be induced to buy it under a misconception. Dr. Bjerre's volume might be called *A History of Psychotherapy* without any special harm to any one. It most certainly is not "the history" nor even "A history" of psychanalysis.*

Dr. Bjerre could have begun his volume with Kant and Feuchtersleben, as he has done, only by ignoring the fact that what distinguishes psychanalysis from all other therapies that call themselves "psychic" is the "analysis." Detaching the interest from a painful fact and projecting it upon a fact less painful, whether it is done by Kant, Bjerre, or by the first mother who dangles a rag doll in front of her ailing child, is not psychanalysis, because no analysis is therein employed. Suggestion and hypnosis, whatever their nature, of whatever school, and no matter how much Dr. Bjerre knows about them and how successfully he may practice them, are not psychanalysis, since they do not involve analysis. I am more than willing to allow Dr. Bjerre his good intentions; he was no doubt well-meaning; but, once he has chosen to write a history of psychanalysis, he should have stuck to that, no matter how much more attractive other facts are to him. But if, on the other hand, he had not intended to write a history of psychanalysis, then he should not have named his book such.

It is understandable to me why a man of Dr. Bjerre's temperament should find psychanalysis distasteful to him. Analysis makes of the psychanalyst a kind

*It is, of course, not impossible, that the publisher and not the author is responsible for the book's misleading title.—En.

of tender of the psychic machine; the psychanalyst knows the psychic machine and knows how to discover what is wrong with it when it gets out of order, and that is very nearly all he is. He takes his seat and starts the machine going; and, just as long as the machine keeps going, there is nothing the analyst can or should do; for the machine must be let to run itself just as long as it can run at all; and even when it comes to a stop it must be given an opportunity to start itself; and if it does manage to start itself it must again be allowed to run as it will; for just as long as the machine keeps going it keeps going right, no matter what it turns out. The kind of a person the psychanalyst chances to be, aside from his function of psychic machine tender, does not affect the situation in any way. He might be a poet or a minister of the Gospel. But if he were a hard-headed realist who believed in nothing that is not reported to him by his senses, it would not affect his functional worth in the slightest. He might even be a Bolshevik without any injury to the person being analyzed. Dr. Bjerre, on the contrary, places the supreme worth with the operator. The psychotherapist must be (Dr. Bjerre says that he is) a poet and artist; he must be supersensitive to human pain; his heart must be in the right place and must be attuned with the infinite; he must be a god, or at the very least, the next thing to it.

If ever Dr. Poul Bjerre should feel like treating himself to a little surprise, he might practice a little Freudian analysis on himself; he will then discover that he had been paying himself the most exalted sort of compliments without his even being aware of it.

To clinch the argument that his own method is better than that of Freudian analysis, Dr. Bjerre offers us "Extracts from a Case-History." We have a right to assume that Dr. Bjerre is doing his own method no injustice by the case cited. And what do we learn from that case? That any Freudian analyst would have found the case as easy as taking candy from a baby; whereas Dr. Bjerre was blind and adrift throughout the treatment, and had allowed himself to be duped. The improvement that resulted, in so far as it was not due to lucky accidents, was at least as much due to the patient's niece as to the efforts of Dr. Bjerre.

The patient as a child hated her father; she dreamt of being a princess asleep in a castle and being awakened with a kiss by a prince who came from a long distance. Meanwhile she had developed a strong attachment for an elder sister and they agreed to marry each other; at the age of thirteen the patient and her sister found a house in which they expressed their intention of living together as old maids. When she was eighteen she inserted an advertisement in a newspaper, pretending that she was seeking a mate; this resulted in

a correspondence that lasted without interruption for twenty years, during which time, though they both lived in the same city, the correspondents never met. He was to her the fair prince she had dreamt of earlier. She then met a man who loved her, but after seven years of strife she broke with him because of her inability to free herself from the writer of the letters. When the patient was thirty-eight years of age, she for the first time met the man she had been corresponding with all those years. He proved to be not merely commonplace but he was at that very time in the midst of a liaison with the patient's youngest sister. During these years she had been a teacher in private families and in a higher school for girls. When she freed herself from the man she had been corresponding with, she gave up teaching and took various positions, but gave them up one after the other, and travelled in foreign countries. Thus far she had had no normal sexual life. One winter she met a man for whom she felt no love, but as she wanted to live the life of a woman, she made use of the opportunity. This affair came to an end the following November. She then attended a horse race in order to report it for a newspaper; there she found herself beside an elegantly dressed woman. She observed that various men made strange signs to that woman, especially with their tongues; presently she became aware that these signs had a hidden sexual meaning. After that she began to notice that people in the street began to make the same signs to her; but especially did waiters persecute her with strange movements of their tongues. She returned home, only to find that she was being persecuted in the same way.

The case takes up forty-eight pages of Bjerre's book; I have necessarily had to leave out many suggestive facts. But the singular fact is that Dr. Bjerre attributes the persecution mania not to the sudden interruption but to the unconventionality of her sexual experience. The patient suffered because she had unconsciously identified herself with that woman of the half-world and had consequently herself filled in the later gestures of the men. She had imagined herself a fallen woman, and so thought that everybody knew of her disgraceful liaison. This enabled Dr. Bjerre to preach to her by the hour for months and months, and it was that preaching, his fatherly advice and education, that contributed to the final cure.

When a man is determined to play the role of the All-Father and will not give it up, it goes without saying that he will not consent to play the comparatively negligible role of the Freudian psychanalyst. Even a limited omnipotence is more attractive than the reasonable matter-of-fact procedure of the Freudian psychanalysis. Men will not give up magic just because they happen to practice psychotherapy. Rather will they repudiate Freud and reason.

I. SOLON.

BAUDOUIN, CH.: SUGGESTION ET AUTOSUGGESTION. ETUDE PSYCHOLOGIQUE ET PEDAGOGIQUE D'APRES LES RESULTATS DE LA NOUVELLE ECOLE DE NANCY.—Paris: Delachaux & Niestle. [*Suggestion and Autosuggestion. A psychologic and pedagogic study of the results obtained by the new School of Nancy.*]

To the many books on suggestion there is now added a new one which deserves the careful consideration of all physicians interested in psychotherapeutics. The author is a disciple of Emile Coué who stands for the second School of Nancy for him. The first was represented by Liébault and Bernheim, whose pupil Coué was. This second School of Nancy lays the chief stress on autosuggestion. To us the differences between these two schools do not seem to be very great. Baudouin is familiar with *psa.* and tries to view both *psa.* and suggestion from a common viewpoint. The new method consists in impressing the patient with the idea that the waking suggestions are really auto-suggestions. Coué treats his patients in groups of twenty or thirty at a time, grouping recent and old cases together. In this way an atmosphere of suggestion is created which, for obvious reasons, conduces to good results. The author presents us with a detailed description of the technique as well as with carefully detailed case histories showing extraordinary successes. I am convinced that the results obtained will withstand the most careful medical scrutiny, for I have again and again had striking proofs of the amazing results obtainable by psychotherapy. In the last few months, for example, my colleague, Dr. Weinbrenner, residing in a suburb of Vienna, referred to me a forty-three year old peasant suffering from very severe asthma which could be relieved only by several injections of adrenalin daily. I thought the malady had a sexual basis. Without going into the question of the cause of his disease, I hypnotized the invalid in a few seconds by the method of sudden surprise. I demonstrated the method to my colleague and advised him to omit the injections and to hypnotize the patient daily at first, then every second day, then every third day, and so on. A month later I got this letter from the doctor: "The patient's return home was not pleasant. On his arrival home he had such a severe attack that I could hardly get him into bed. That day he got five injections! I hypnotized him the next day and kept this up as you instructed. His improvement was striking. After eight months of unavailing treatment with drugs, hypnotism is working wonders. All last month he got only five injections, whereas formerly he had to have as many as eighty, because he used to summon me at all hours of the day and night. The hypnotic magic works only for two or three days. How can I cure him altogether?"

There's the rub! Hypnosis or autosuggestion is only a step towards a cure. Neither throws any light on the hidden connection between the malady and

the causal experience. Only analysis can do that, especially if as in such cases as the above, it can be employed as a supplement to hypnosis. But I gladly concede that in the hands of a physician suggestion and hypnosis are valuable weapons. And they are excellent means of bringing home to the physician the powerful effects of psychic influences. But a cure can be brought about only by self-knowledge and conscious conquest.

I am doubtful about Baudouin's demand to make use of suggestion as an educational measure along the lines outlined by Coué. Cautiously the father should approach the sleeping child, lay his hand slightly on his forehead, whisper words suggestive of sleep to it, and then make the necessary curative suggestions. This procedure should be carried out daily. According to Coué the child should be given its daily suggestion as regularly as its chocolate or milk. But to me it seems that the best method of influencing children is by the parents' example. Parents will exert the most wholesome influence on the child by the way they deport themselves.

The book is, however, full of new outlooks and new ideas, and is singularly adapted to making the significance of psychic influence comprehensible. Because of this it is an excellent introduction to the study of *psa*. Freud, as we know, travelled this road and his first work was done with the aid of suggestion. It is only when we comprehend the significance of suggestion that we understand what progress *psa*. has made possible. Now and then suggestion may be efficaciously combined with *psa*. and thus conduce to brilliant results, but most of the time suggestion is superfluous. No one should attempt so delicate and perilous a task as meddling with a human soul, especially a sick one, without a thorough knowledge of suggestion, and for this purpose I cannot recommend a better book than Professor Baudouin's.

W. STEKEL. [S. A. T.]

FRIED, EUGEN, M. D.: DER VAGINISMUS U. DIE EHEN PERVERSER MAENNER. [*Vaginismus and the Marriage of Male Perverts.*] *Privately printed.* Wien, 1919; 17 pp., 8°.

In justice to the author of this singular essay we shall quote, in translation, his own summary of his thesis. He says: "An attack of vaginismus is a tic-like protective and defensive reaction which occurs in psychosexually normal women as soon as they have served as the objects of sexual activities of a specifically homosexual character. Homosexual men are perverse not only sexually

but also ethically. The variety of ethical perversion peculiar to the homosexual is the same as that observed in patients suffering from chronic mania. Local treatment, especially surgical measures of whatever nature, are utterly to be repudiated. The marriage of a normal woman with a perverted male must, under all circumstances, be dissolved, especially if, as in the case of the marriage of bisexual men, there are children by the union."

Inasmuch as Dr. Fried gives no case histories and nothing but categorical assertions in developing his thesis—a strange one!—we are strongly tempted to regard the whole paper as a joke. If the author is serious we would refer him to Dr. Stekel's splendid work on 'sexual frigidity in woman' in which he will learn the truth about vaginismus.

S. A. TANNENBAUM.

KNAPP, MARK I: A NEW CONCEPTION OF ASTHMA. (Reprint.) N. Y. *Medical Journal*, June 10, 1920, iii: 55-9.

From time immemorial the medical profession and laymen have been wont to attribute human ills to errors in diet and to disturbances in the "terra incognita" of the alimentary tract. Dr. Knapp, true to form, expounds the theory that asthma is due to pyloric insufficiency. As a result of this insufficiency, he says, there is inadequate gastric digestion, excessive gas formation, increased intra-abdominal pressure which "forces the diaphragm upward against the lungs," interference with the pulmonic function and—asthma. He claims to have cured 400 (!) cases by lavage of the stomach, regulation of the diet and—the administration of bromides (instead of salt) "without regard to the dose."

Merely as a slight illustration of how ill-considered and poorly reasoned Dr. Knapp's argument is, we quote the following sentence: "Those who believe in psychical causes for asthma will find it very hard to reconcile their views with the actual fact of the setting in of the spasms, as the patient has been in bed, sleeping, for some hours, before the beginning of his misery and therefore could not be exposed to psychical influences."

Further comment is unnecessary.

S. A. T.

SCHROEDER, THEODORE: DETERMINISM, CONDUCT AND FEAR PSYCHOLOGY. (Reprint.) *Psychoanalytic Review*, N. Y., Oct., 1919; 6:379-390.

In this paper Mr. Schroeder, one of the most serious-minded American

students of psychology and psa., as well as one of the most devoted champions of human rights, attempts a purely objective and rationalistic reply to a criticism of the Freudian theory of determinism by Professor Jennings. (*Experimental Determinism and Human Conduct*. The J. of Phil., Psych. and Scientific Method, 16:180-183; March 17, 1919.) Mr. Schroeder maintains that Jennings "and others" are incapable of accepting the Freudian theory because they are afraid, because they are afraid of losing the belief in free-will, because of "moral" considerations. According to him these fear-full psychologists are in a conflict between, on the one hand, a desire to conform their theories and lives "according to an understanding of determinism acquired through experimental psychology" and, on the other hand, an "urge to conform psychologic theory and life to moralistic standards of value, doubtless acquired during youth." With all of which we most heartily agree.

This essay of Schroeder's, like everything else he has written, deserves very careful consideration because of his earnestness, sincerity and lofty tone. We regret, however, to have to add that unless the reader has a great deal of time and perseverance, he will lose patience with Mr. Schroeder's style, which is heavy, ponderous and involved. A man with a message, especially one who does so much "to make this world a better place to live in," should carry his self-analysis further and give up the infantile idea that a pedantic style is essential to a philosophic discussion. A good god speaks in the language of the people.

Without further explanation than this paper affords, I cannot accept Mr. Schroeder's statement that "the therapeutic measure of the psychoanalysts is largely a matter of ridding the patient of the moralistic fears of vengeance, against which the patient ignorantly seeks protection by more anti-social behavior." Nor can I, therefore, accept his inference that the successful analyst is one who is sufficiently "free from conflicts to have outgrown moral judgments."

S. A. TANNENBAUM.

TISCHNER, RUDOLPH:—*UEBER TELEPATHIE U. HELLSEHEN. EXPERIMENTELL-THEORETISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN.* [*Telepathy and Clairvoyance. An Experimental and Theoretical Study.*] Munich: I. F. Bergmann, 1920. *Grenzfragen des Nerven—und Seelenlebens: No. CVI.*

The intense scepticism with which physicians and scientists regard every-

thing that partakes of the "occult" makes it almost impossible for serious students to busy themselves with these matters. Loss of caste is an almost inevitable consequence. Considerable courage is still necessary for the description of facts which do not fit into the scheme of what is officially approved of as "science,"—an attitude which naturally does not in the least affect the existence of these facts. The phenomena of telepathy have, to be sure, found scientific champions, e.g., Kotik, Loewenfeld, Staudenmayer, Schottelius, whereas others, e.g., Dessoir and, more recently, Hopp hold that almost all phenomena of the kind are to be regarded as illusions and errors of observation. The safest course for the unbiased inquirer is to experience and test these matters personally. I have applied this method and have come to the conclusion that telepathic phenomena are by no means extraordinary but are rather matters of every-day occurrence. Dr. Tischner, a Munich physician, who has devoted himself for a considerable time to "occult phenomena," now publishes the results of his experiments on several persons. His calm objective presentation of these experiments and his unimpassioned theoretical analyses constitute a grateful contrast to the fanatical manner so commonly assumed by other apostles of telepathy. The material he has collected is most interesting and is worthy of the attention of all physicians interested in psychological problems. The existence of a telepathic ability is, *me judice*, demonstrated beyond cavil.* *Quod erat demonstrandum.* The author's theoretical considerations are debatable.

W. STEKEL. [G. F. S.]

*I regret that I cannot share my distinguished colleague's opinion. Nothing that I have read, heard or experienced has in the least impressed me with the possibility of communicating thought from person to person by any other means than by the agency of nerves, muscles, and sense organs.—ED.

STEKEL, WILHELM: DIE GESCHLECHTSKAELTE DER FRAU. [*Sexual Frigidity in Woman.*] Berlin-Wien: Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1920. Pp. 402. Price: M26.

This book is thus reviewed in a recent issue of the *Medizinische Klinik* of Vienna:

"With this monograph Stekel publishes the third volume of his work on 'the disturbances of the impulses and emotions' [which is to be completed in ten volumes]. In it he discusses exhaustively a theme that is not only of immense significance in our judgment of the female psyche but even more so for the solution of the great human problems associated with love and marriage. Any one who would be a real physician for women ought to study the book before us very carefully. It will acquaint the reader with the numerous types of unhappy women—with all their internal struggles and conflicts—who are vainly searching for happiness, and it will teach him how to penetrate, under the guidance of psychoanalysis, those mysterious labyrinths which lead to an understanding (!)—not, as is usually the case, merely to assertions—of the disturbances of women's love-life. Stekel's book testifies to the author's vast experience; exhaustive histories, fascinating descriptions and well considered disentanglement of most complicated and muddled psychic processes stamp it as one of the significant events in the medical book world, and its masterly handling of its theme will hold the reader from the first page to the last even though he may not be inclined to accept all the deductions of this clever and well-read author. In fifteen chapters—[dealing, among other subjects, with love at first sight, individual conditions for love, sexual traumata of adults, the psychology of the frigid woman, infantile fixations, the will for displeasure, imagined love, the conflict of the sexes, the analysis of a transvestite, etc.,] Stekel leads his reader through the complicated mechanism of woman's psychic and physical love and proves that her sexual frigidity is a mental and not a physical symptom and has its origin in the fact that with advancing civilization woman is steadily becoming more resentful of her role as a mere sexual object,—a manifestation of her 'refusal to enjoy, in order not to succumb,' of a struggle on the part of the female 'intellect against her instincts,' of a conflict between 'brain and spinal cord.'

KRITZLER. [S. A. T.]

ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORTHCOMING ARTICLES

- The Analysis of Experimental Dreams.....Oskar Pfister
The Causes and Treatment of Depression.....Wilhelm Stekel
The Symbolism of Freemasonry (concluded).....Herbert Silberer
The Human Situation in War and Peace.....Israel Solon
The Origin of Superstition..... Max Kahane.
Dreams as a Basis for Superstition; Neurosis as Superstition.
By J. Marcinowski.
The Religious Psychologist.....Theodore Schroeder
The Psycho-Sexual Significance of Money.....S. A. Tannenbaum
The Craving for Miracles.....Herbert Silberer
The Psychology of Literary Invention.....Leo Kaplan
Analysis of Wilde's, "The Picture of Dorian Grey".....Leo Kaplan
Analysis of Strindberg's "Der Vater".....Leo Kaplan
Crystal Gazing Herbert Silberer
The History of a Homosexual.....C. K. Gerster


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